

UNITED STATES ARMY
COMBAT FORCES

Journal

Infantry Journal

• Field Artillery Journal

JUNE 1953

50¢



**A NEW GENERATION OF AMERICANS
LEARN TO SHOOT TO KILL**

THE TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN ARMOR

NO article we have ever seen in an American military journal has seemed more calculated to intensify sharp division in our Army than "Ground Force Mobility," by Brigadier General Paul M. Robinett, in the March-April issue of *Armor* magazine, the journal of the U. S. Armor Association. Not only does General Robinett attack our World War II and our present high command as "lacking faith" in mobility. He also inveighs against the Eisenhower and Bradley headquarters (SHAEP and 12th Army Group) of World War II as "overstuffed" staffs given to "sloth-like operations" and defensive tendencies, such as keeping General George Patton's Third Army braked down to a crawl. Patton could have won the war, so General Robinett implies, in a mere fraction of the time it took.

The mobile great of history, we gather from this extreme distortion of it, were Napoleon and Hitler—Hitler especially, with the great Guderian to guide him away from the mud-slow pace of the German general staff. But the "mobile-minded Fuehrer," we learn, "came to his tragic end still commanding imaginary mobile forces, which in reality existed only on paper . . ."

General Robinett, of course, as an all-out armor man, insists that Patton's Army should have been an "armored army"—an army made up solely of clanking armored divisions and no other kind. We get this criticism without a word about armor logistics. And why is there no mention of Jenghiz Khan, speediest of all great leaders of the past?

According to General Robinett, we seem to have nobody today in our high command and staff who is either mobile-minded or offensive-minded. He speaks all too plainly of "the defensive-mindedness of our current leadership" which seems to us an amazing and totally unwarranted statement. We cannot see why any American military magazine could say that Eisenhower, Bradley, Collins, Ridgway, Clark, Hull, or any others now in a high Army place are men lacking in aggressiveness. History has shown again and again that these leaders have the spirit of the offensive.

WE can forgive a soldier for getting so enthusiastic over his own branch that he sneers good-naturedly at the others. But when people get so branch-centered that they are blind to the facts, it seems to us time to call a halt. General Robinett actually quotes Secretary Pace's 1950 statement on the rapid obsolescence of the tank as "loss of faith" in mobile warfare.

What in the name of national defense has "loss of faith" to do with a high official's clearly informative statement that the tank was most probably a goner—against the great new weapons under development?

When we learned of *Armor's* misstatement, we decided to ask a 1953 question. We asked it of an equally important (many would say more important) authority—a great scientist of wide military comprehension. We asked whether the tank was badly threatened by new weapons developments. His answer was right to the point. He was much more forceful and positive about it than the former Secretary of the Army was three years ago.

Naturally the details of modern antitank measures cannot be discussed publicly. It should be no surprise to anyone that better and better ways are found of stopping tanks in their tracks. The ballistic possibilities have always been with the antitank weapons.

Our opinion of the tank today rests solely on its capabilities and limitations.

It is a powerful and vitally important weapon—against any foe not strong in modern antitank power. Against disorganization and weakness it is extremely valuable. Against a strong enemy with modern antitank weapons and equipment, it still may be of some considerable impact, but only at great cost in tankers and their tanks.

Against atomic weapons the tank is particularly helpless—in fact, a sort of trap, because, being of metal, it gets "hot" and stays hot for quite a while. It would be suicidal to stay in a tank hot from radioactive atomic particles.

IN our opinion there is no question that the tank is still an important weapon. In our July issue we will have an article showing the splendid use of tanks by the 3d Division against Heartbreak Ridge in 1951. Here was a completely coordinated action. The 2d Engineer Battalion carved miles of roads up rocky streambeds so the 729th Tank Battalion could reach the rear of the ridge while the 9th and 38th Infantry attacked with full support of all available artillery units.

This happened to be an *infantry* use of tanks and a fine one. *Armor* is inclined to think that non-tankers don't know a track from a turret.

It's our belief that we should have no "non-tankers." Every senior and junior leader in every combat unit, no matter what branch, should have a good knowledge of tanks. Their capabilities and limitations and their methods of operation and use are really no mystery.

It would help greatly to spread armor discussion if the professional material in *Armor* magazine appeared in *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*. Much of the discussion in *Armor*, unlike the Robinett article, makes good sense and ought to reach far more military readers. But as long as the members of the Armor branch keep on closely confining their useful tank material to a few thousand Armor Association member-readers, the tank may remain something of a mystery to a great many people.

If there is a "tank message," an "Armor message," and we believe there is, it should reach a readership a dozen times as big as now.

Union with the Association of the U. S. Army would make the voice of *Armor* properly heard—heard by tens of thousands of others besides largely *Armor* readers as now.

The traditions of *Armor* and its Cavalry predecessor are great ones. They should never be lost. They deserve wider dissemination in the new Army than they are getting.

In our opinion, also, open unreasoned attack upon the great and proved leaders of today's Army does not lie within the traditions we here honor.



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HOLLAND—When the raging North Sea inundated lowland areas of Holland and England, thousands of victims were carried to safety by helicopters from American, British and Dutch military units. Sikorsky S-55 and S-51 types again demonstrated helicopter versatility, rescuing victims from the flood and bringing in relief supplies. Here an R.A.F. S-51 lands on a road isolated by the flood.



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MALAYA—Sikorsky S-55 and S-51 helicopters have strengthened British forces in Malaya, where their ability to operate without prepared landing fields is particularly valuable, in the struggle against communist guerrillas.

Here a group of S-55s flies in review at the Royal Navy Air Station, Gosport, England, before embarking for Malaya on a British aircraft carrier. They were supplied under terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



KOREA—A mine-spotting Navy Sikorsky HO3S helicopter takes off from its floating base on the deck of an LST somewhere off Korea. From a hovering position, its pilot can spot submerged mines not visible from shipboard. With helicopter-minesweeper teamwork, safe channels can be cleared quickly, and danger reduced to a minimum.



LABRADOR—Pilots of Marine Air Group 26 gave their HRS Sikorskys a workout over the bleak Labrador coast recently in training maneuvers. Specialized tactics, made possible by the extreme mobility and utility of helicopters, were tested in ship-to-shore operations. The Sikorskys were based on the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Kula Gulf.

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
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Though the technique is not yet perfected, the success of Operation "Test Drop" proves that we can deliver construction equipment to remote areas and quickly establish airstrips within striking distance of the enemy.

Geronimo! A ribbon, or extraction chute streams out behind the flying boxcar. As it opens, it holds the tractor back, pulling it out of the airplane. The tractor then swings downward and six main parachutes open. Main chutes are 100 feet in diameter.

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★ To the Editors . . . ★

Romance and Assignment

To the Editors:

I am in love with a wonderful girl I met while stationed in California before going to Korea. We plan to be married the minute I get off the boat at San Francisco.

My problem is this. I entered the service from Massachusetts and I am afraid that I will be ordered to Fort Devens or somewhere else on the East Coast. But I want to stay in California. Can you arrange it for me? Also my folks are now living in California.

CPL. (Name Withheld)

Armored FA Bn.
Korea

● We are all for romance, Corporal, but you can help yourself more than we can help you. Here's how. Right now, before your rotation comes up, put in a letter through channels asking that your records be changed to show that your home is now in California—use your parents' address. In AFPE, reassignments of homeward bound soldiers are made at Sasebo, in Japan, on the basis of each soldier's home of record. If your records show you live in Massachusetts you'll probably get orders—while still on the boat—to report to Fort Devens, but if you can get your record changed, you will probably find yourself right where you want to be. In case your rotation comes up before the record can be changed, it may be possible for you to arrange for the change while you are being processed at Sasebo. Ask a personnel officer about it.

Boling Rides Again

To the Editors:

Lord love us, Lieutenant M. E. A. G. bus ("Machine Guns—We Need Them") is taking us back to the "two mil tap." When the Army gets back to McClellan and Phillips, too, I'll come back.

CWO JACK L. BOLING

USAF

Dedham, Mass.

Albatross of a Low Report

To the Editors:

Your article "Low Reports" in the April issue was "right on."

As a brand-new Second John in 1942, I was presented with the Headquarters Battery of a new armored field artillery battalion. My first sergeant turned out to be a "bottle baby" and I had to break him after finding him drunk on duty three times in a row. I was saddled with a battalion commander who was a nice guy but was the psychological prisoner of his exec, a rotund, overage-in-grade major who was twelve years older than the CO. This exec had more grasp of the letter of the regulations than judgment and a heart

that would make Nicholas Nickleby's uncle look like St. Francis of Assisi. His baleful influence wrecked morale among the junior officers and eventually even got the battalion commander canned.

I had, at that time, more enthusiasm than diplomacy and in a few months was divested of my battery and sent to another one as executive, dragging along an efficiency rating of Satisfactory. From thence I was jettisoned to Div Arty with a Very Satisfactory. One week later, the firing battery I had trained racked up the highest score in the entire Corps on the battery tests. My ex-CO came to Div Arty and told me that he knew that "the good showing was due to the job I had done," but he didn't offer to change the VS. I felt like asking him why he killed the goose that laid the golden egg; I forbore.

To cap the climax, when I left Div Arty, the CO called me in and asked me (1) why I had come over with only a VS, and (2) what had I done that made me feel my rating should be any better. This time I took the bull by the horns and told him a few of my achievements. I got an Excellent.

Since those days many years ago, I have received Superior ratings from officers ranging from the Chief of Staff of a Theater to the CO of a light field artillery battalion in combat.

The damage, however, has already been done. I have been systematically passed over throughout the years as a result of that first year. Currently I am riding well along the back side of my class hump. D/A temporary promotions were supposed to remedy these wartime defects, but after the smoke cleared away the same people that ranked me before still did.

How long do I have to carry this albatross?

MAJOR R. A. TEEDOFF

Ratings by Subordinates and Equals

To the Editors:

In the April issue of the JOURNAL, Lieut. F. A. Wolak suggests efficiency reports be rendered by superiors, equals, and subordinates. That's a fine idea. I have advocated it for years, and for important reasons. I am firmly convinced that it is possible to bluff a superior almost all of the time, and a subordinate, almost none of the time. We all know officers who have gone well to the top on the dead and mangled careers of their subordinates. We all know the officer who has built a brilliant reputation by being the "middleman" between sound-thinking and hard-working subordinates and that officer's superior without ever giving credit where due.

One natural reaction to the idea is to cry "bootlick." This would certainly seem to be an inevitable result of having sub-

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An important and definite step toward the relief—if not the solution—of take-off and landing problems of modern high-speed airplanes was taken recently in Wichita, Kansas, when Cessna Aircraft Company tested a converted Cessna 170 with a "boundary layer control" installation.


Modified under contract with the Office of Naval Research — the test plane produced specific data which verified the promise of extreme high lift thought to be contained in the boundary control principle. The tests definitely pointed the way toward practical boundary layer control installations which would greatly shorten take-off and landing distances for both military and commercial aircraft.

Boundary Layer Control is one of several military projects now speeding ahead at Cessna in Wichita.

Another, is development of the world's first turboprop lightplane. Also, Cessna experimentation on a new helicopter, continued production of the famous L-19 Army observation plane and manufacturing of assemblies for high-speed fighter and bomber planes.


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Combat infantrymen, quickly recognizing its unique value, dubbed it "Operation Lifesaver."



ordinates make out efficiency reports, but it is not very likely for two reasons. First, there is the risk of the subordinate detecting it—and it shouldn't be hard—and not liking it, to rate the bootlicker "low." Secondly, the superior who also will be rating would probably be aware of it and he also would rate accordingly. In any event, it couldn't be worse than "bootlicking" superiors, and in some outfits, maybe a little more thought to those "down the line" wouldn't hurt.

I believe that a very important pattern would soon become evident in the case of each officer. As Lieutenant Wolak points out, the spread of all the reports tends to minimize the effects of over or under rating of easy or tough raters. Since this would result in an increased workload for the efficiency report people, I would recommend elimination from Lieutenant Wolak's suggestion those reports made out by officers of equal rank as they would normally be the least valuable and most suspect of personal prejudice. Perhaps some plan could be evolved where the superior's report would constitute say 50 percent of the total rating while that of each of two subordinates, 25 percent.

LT. COL. M. H. ROSEN

Arlington, Va.

To the Editors:

In "Front and Center" April 1953, I read that "Little can be done to stop the making and selling of fraudulent service ribbons." I have a solution to this problem. If the commanding officers of posts and camps were to send out their provost marshals with instruction to put "off limits," all stores selling unauthorized items of clothing, insignia and equipment, I'm sure the selling part could be stopped in short order.

A plan for the education of all would help a lot. It is not only the short term that does not understand the regulations. Many officers and senior noncoms wear unauthorized insignia and ribbons. The DUC, Fourragère, occupation ribbon and insignia on the right shoulder are flagrant examples.

CAPT. LAWRENCE J. WERNSMAN

411 Madison Street
Jefferson City, Mo.

Missing Punch Bowl

To the Editors:

The 2d Infantry Regiment is reconstructing its trophy room and is attempting to locate lost and misplaced trophies, mementos, pictures, and related material. Of particular interest is the present location of the 2d Infantry Regiment Punch Bowl.

This Punch Bowl is described in records as consisting of a silver outer bowl, or shell, with "2d Infantry" inscribed, and an inner bowl, or liner, of glass. There is a silver ladle.

Information we have suggests that the Punch Bowl was transferred to the 7th Infantry Regiment's Officers' Club on 20 Sep-

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

A Salute **TO THE LOW-FLYING MEN!**



All hail to the ace in the "wild blue yonder" . . . but let's give with some man-sized cheers for the lads who slug it out at hill-top level. From the time they take off . . . till the mission is completed, these strategic fighter bombers and tactical close support pilots face a brutal blasting all along the way.

> > > Sniped at by small arms and machine guns . . . bracketed by flak with the constant hazard of limping home harassed by enemy aircraft . . . these are the stout warriors for whom we've planned Republic's rugged THUNDER-craft . . . to get them there . . . do the job, and bring them back.

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tember 1946, was turned in to G4, 3d Infantry Division, 4 January 1947, and subsequently on 6 August 1947, donated to the Post Officers' Club, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Further documentation is not available and there is a presumption that the Punch Bowl, and its records might have been destroyed in the fire which destroyed the club at Fort Campbell in July 1948.

Information received from Fort Campbell indicates that the Punch Bowl was not listed among the property destroyed and inquiry fails to reveal conclusively that the Bowl was destroyed: the possibility exists that it might be in the possession of some individual or a bank for safekeeping.

If any of your readers are able to furnish information which will assist in locating the Bowl, the 2d Infantry Regiment would be very grateful for it.

COL. M. C. HIGGINS

Hq 2d Inf Regt
5th Inf Div
Indiantown Gap, Pa.

Roads Are Useful To the Editors:

Re "Put 'Em on Tracks," COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, April 1953. Granted we need cross-country vehicles for fighting tasks. Granted further, that when no adequate road net exists, we need cross-country

mobility for logistic support. It does not follow, however, that such characteristics are the most desirable when conditions allow otherwise. Even the tank uses the road when there is a suitable road.

Patton followed the roadways, not to accommodate the supply vehicles, but because they allowed his tanks greater speed. The Red Ball followed the roadways, not because the vehicles used could not go cross-country, but because that was the only way possible to keep up with the road-running tanks.

Indeed, the limitations of the Red Ball were not that the vehicles were road-bound, but simply that the vehicles possessed certain unnecessary off-road characteristics which limited their load-carrying capacities. When you add four-wheel drive, 24 volt electrical systems, deep-water gadgets, greater power and traction to a vehicle, in order to give it greater cross-country mobility, you reduce proportionately the ability of the vehicle to transport a load. This not only spirals costs and burdens maintenance, but results in more vehicles required to do the same task.

There is every evidence that the Red Ball will be repeated. It was repeated four times over in Europe after the original achievement: in the ABC, the Green Diamond, the Yellow Diamond, and the mammoth XYZ across Germany. It was duplicated, on a different scale, in North

Africa, Iran, Burma, Australia, and Korea. You simply do not, in war, do things the hard way when the simple way is best and most effective.

The wheeled vehicle is a necessary weapon in any modern land army. It cannot replace the tank; neither can it be replaced by the tracked vehicle and still fulfill its mission of delivering fuel and ammunition, quickly and repeatedly, over long distances in support of the slower, more "dogged" tank.

CAPTAIN AVERY E. KOLB

2952 So. Columbus St.
Arlington, Virginia

Drivers Make Good Transportation

To the Editors:

The March issue COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is an excellent compendium of articles dealing with the subject of Infantry transportation. I was surprised and somewhat disappointed, however, that after scanning through it I found nowhere any mention of the most important factor of them all concerning driving and transportation, the piece of equipment behind the steering wheel, the GI driver. With but one exception (the photo of a driver, knee-deep in mud, on page 27) no one really has said "in designing and use of trucks we also consider the GI driver" or words to that effect.

If the ratio of trucks to troops was and is one to five, then in World War II we had roughly three-fourths million of our soldiers as drivers. This is a big figure. In all fairness to our military drivers, the privates and corporals, there should've been an article about them.

In the final analysis the "interchangeability," the "reliability," the "productivity" and other big words concerning transportation amount to only as much and no more than does the driver's willingness to drive and the responsibility he assumes for the particular vehicle he has been entrusted to drive and maintain.

MAJOR FRANK NOVAK

Deputy Provost Marshal
APO 742, c/o PM
New York, New York

Rotate Units

To the Editors:

I am Regular Army all the way. My subject is rotation . . . individual rotation. In basic training a man is told that he is a part of a team and that team work is all that counts. As he goes through basic his platoon works toward that goal, he gets to know and trust his buddies on his right and left, he gets to depend on them, he knows that they will be there when he wants them, he gets to know his squad sergeant, platoon sergeant, and officer. At the end of fourteen weeks he knows he is part of a team, his morale is high, he brags of his platoon and company. He thinks and knows that he is part of the best team or platoon, in the best company, in the

(Continued on Page 33)

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2 GREAT POLICIES FOR PREFERRED ARMY PERSONNEL



Watch Out for "Cost per Ton-Mile"... IT'S LOADED!

"Cost per ton-mile" is what military planners watch in everything that concerns air transport to our Armed Forces. And rightly! But let's be careful what we mean by "ton-mile cost." It's got to be *loaded* cost.

Men can march on and off *any* plane. The big problem is equipment . . . tanks, trucks, bulldozers, massive pieces. Operating cost for such shipments *must* include loading and unloading . . . with all the attendant factors. If equipment has to be knocked down and crated, then uncrated and reassembled at destination . . . that's cost. Man-hours for handling, expensive machinery for carting, hoisting, stowing . . . that's cost. And longer turnaround time for these cumbersome operations is also cost . . . idle aircraft eating up dollars.

Reckoned completely, with all these factors, ton-mile cost for the Fairchild Packet C-119 is the lowest

ever achieved in air history! Tanks and trucks roll up its ramp as easily as men march in. Bulk cargo goes "as is." Turnaround time is the fastest ever. And in addition, this rugged "Flying Boxcar" is the most versatile in air transport. No other aircraft has remotely approached its successful score for air drops of men and materiel . . . 10 tons dropped from a single C-119!

No other aircraft can match its record for "dirty jobs" done triumphantly . . . short-haul and long-haul, from the Berlin airlift to Korean mountains.

To military men all over the world, the TWIN BOOM of the Fairchild Packet means "big stuff" ready to land . . . tons of bulky supplies or squads of troops ready to pour down the ramp and go into action at the lowest total cost in money and time. That's lowest *total* cost . . . *ton-mile cost loaded, and unloaded.*



EASE OF LOADING any type of bulk military materials—fully assembled in minimum time—means greater military successes and lower "cost per ton-mile."

ANY TYPE OF MILITARY LOAD from bulldozers to anti-aircraft batteries—men and supplies—fully assembled and equipped—ready for action—means lower "cost per ton-mile."

TURN-AROUND TIME is reduced to the absolute minimum—with rapid unloading features—and no special handling equipment needed—means lower "cost per ton-mile."



20 February 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: The Future of the Military Services as a Career That Will Attract Capable Personnel

DURING the course of the past several years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have become increasingly concerned about the growing lack of confidence among Armed Forces personnel in the military service as a worthwhile and respected career. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are particularly concerned, however, as to the implications of this situation as they affect the future of the military services as a career that will attract and hold capable officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers.

This concern stems from discussions, observations and impressions gained on visits to military installations, both in the United States and overseas, and from mail and reports received from various representatives of the military services. A brief discussion of some of the factors which have brought about this problem, together with some thoughts concerning an approach to its resolution follow.

THE primary reason for this growing lack of confidence in the military services as a career, stems from the feeling that the Government has broken contract with military personnel and has changed the rules in the middle of the game. Military personnel feel that the Government should keep its part of the contract and abide by the rules with the same degree of conscientiousness as it demands from them. To support this contention, military personnel point to the "Van Zandt Amendment," which denies retirement benefits except when personnel are forced out of the service with the stigma of non-selection; the "Davis Amendment," the immediate result of which is to deny earned promotions to thousands of junior officers and to require the reduction of many others to the next lower grade; the reduction of weight allowances in shipping of household effects for officers, particularly when they have moved their household goods overseas and suddenly find that part of their shipping allowances to return them to the United States has been withdrawn; and, the gradual "whittling away" of fringe benefits such as commissary and exchange privileges and medical and dental care for dependents. Additional factors which have contributed to the reduced attractiveness of the military services as a career are the inequities between the benefits provided to survivors of Regular and Reserve personnel;

the progressive lowering of the standard of living of officer personnel; the increasingly frequent periods of family separation due to lack of dependent housing in overseas areas; and the tendency to diminish the distinction between officers and enlisted personnel, with resultant lack of incentive for advancement to higher rank and its added responsibilities.

Aside from the material causes which have reduced the attractiveness of the military services as a career, the habitual slurring of the officer corps by some members of the Congress and some elements of the press, together with the trend towards legislation by rider, have served to aggravate this serious situation.

VARIOUS combinations of the foregoing factors have unquestionably raised doubts in the minds of capable young men as to the long-term desirability of a military career. As a result, we have been unable to attract and hold as many high-type career officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers as are needed to maintain the high standards of our Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. In other words, it is in the field of obtaining young officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers who wish to make the military profession their career that the implications of this situation are most serious. As an indication of the seriousness of this situation, in the Army alone, 36% of all ROTC students tendered appointments in the Regular Army, during the period 1949-1952, declined; the percentage of resignations from the United States Military Academy has increased from 5.4% in 1950 to 11.9% in 1952; and, the reenlistment rate has dropped from about 60% at the start of World War II to 6.1% in December 1952.

In short, the current situation invites and encourages mediocrity in the direction and management of our armed forces, which the nation can ill afford. Analyzed in the light of the fact that the larger function of our great national budget is now administered by uniformed officers, in whose hands actually repose the key responsibilities for calculating vast material requirements and for supervising the expenditure of great sums of money, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the nation cannot afford to be content with anything short of the highest caliber personnel for our armed forces.

To discourage the development of a high quality corps of officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers by diminishing the attractiveness of such service must ultimately prove to be shortsighted economy with unfavorable reflections not only upon the quality of our defense, but upon the husbanding of our national treasure as well.

Although constructive remedial action is certainly indicated, many of us are too prone to conclude that all of the factors which have contributed to the unattractiveness of military service as a career require legislative action—and hence are generally outside the control of the military. Concerning unfair and malicious attacks made upon the military services, there is the tendency to accept this criticism without any attempt to keep the record straight. In some respects this attitude is understandable, in that it probably stems from the inherent discipline of the uniformed officer and his recognition of the principle of the supremacy of civilian control.

THE Joint Chiefs of Staff feel, however, that much can be done to counteract this worsening situation, and that it is our duty and responsibility to take corrective action as needed. Furthermore, we feel that corrective action can be taken without violating either the letter or the spirit of the principle of civilian control. In general, if we are to be successful in this all-important task of raising the prestige of the military services, we must insure that the combined efforts of the civilian and military personnel of the Department of Defense are harnessed and directed toward that common goal. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the lead in seeking desired corrections must be taken by the civilian element of the Military Departments. Pleading of the case by the uniformed contingent alone would be subject to discount—and even challenge—on the grounds of partisanship.

It is imperative that we initiate action immediately with a view to developing the best possible data on this career problem so as to be able to bring before the Congress and the people the serious situation which exists in the military services today, together with well-thought-out recommendations for correcting same.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff would like to point out, however, that this whole project should be approached with full recognition of the fact that corrective action will not be forthcoming if our efforts are directed only to a defensive

type of operation. In other words, emphasis should be placed on seeking out compensating benefits which will reclaim for the military those losses which have reduced the attractiveness of the service as a career, rather than on trying to hold on to what we have left.

As a first step towards the resolution of this problem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you propose the appointment by the Armed Forces Policy Council of an Ad Hoc Committee, consisting of the Personnel Chiefs of the military services, monitored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel), and assisted by the Director of the Office of Public Information, OSD, to submit appropriate recommendations on the subject.

FURTHER, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you propose for approval of the Armed Forces Policy Council the following terms of reference for the above-mentioned Ad Hoc Committee:

- (1) To undertake an all-out research effort, designed to point up those factors, both materialistic and otherwise, which have served to reduce the attractiveness of the military services as a career.
- (2) To recommend ways and means to counter those factors indicated in the preceding paragraph.
- (3) To indicate which of the recommendations for corrective action can be handled internally by the Department of Defense, require legislation, or have particular implications with regard to the Bureau of the Budget.
- (4) To determine those recommendations for corrective action which can be adapted to a public information program, together with recommendations concerning the implementing media (press, periodicals, radio, film, television, addresses by senior military and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense).
- (5) To formulate an appropriate legislative program to include drafts of legislation required, together with a schedule for submitting same to the Congress.
- (6) To develop complete brochures on all recommendations requiring legislation. These brochures will serve as a basis for testimony by civilian and military personnel appearing before committees of Congress.

OMAR N. BRADLEY,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

WHAT'S BEING DONE ABOUT IT

AS the date—20 February—reveals, Mr. Wilson has had these recommendations of the Joint Chiefs for several months. And as we reported in this magazine last month, he has appointed a special joint service committee to study and report on the subject. Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, the Army's G1, is the Army member of the committee.

President Eisenhower has taken notice of the situation. He directed Mr. Wilson "to organize a study of the problems of attracting and holding competent career personnel—civilian and military—in the De-

partment of Defense," and he told the Congress in his reorganization message:

"We owe it to all the people to maintain the best military establishment that we know how to devise. There are none, however, to whom we owe it more than the soldiers, the sailors, the marines, and the airmen in uniform whose lives are pledged to the defense of our freedom."

This kind of support from the highest levels is heartening to those who have long been alarmed at the persistently insidious attacks on career men in uniform. But there will be opposition, strong and power-

ful opposition. Some of it will be dictated by selfish professional and business groups and some of it will come from those men and women who, through prejudice or ignorance, or both, constantly shout that uniformed men and women are people of small capacity who spend their lives feeding at the public trough. Unfortunately, and dangerously, some of these enemies are in positions of influence in offices of the government. They may not fight openly against the known desires of the President, but some of them may be able to delay,

(Continued on Page 33)



**COLONEL
JOHN T. CORLEY**

**Teaching 20th Century
Americans to shoot to Kill**

NEW COURSES FOR OLD TRADITIONS

THE "finest troops in the world" attacked a small "backwoods rabble" one January morning long ago. When the smoke cleared many of the "finest troops" were sprawled upon the field and the survivors were retreating in disorder. Thus, an American Army, commanded by General Andrew Jackson, smashed a larger British force. The Battle of New Orleans was most humiliating for the European troops—and for European concepts of warfare.

An English observer wrote: "I had heard and read of troops being panic-stricken. This was the first time I ever witnessed it. And they were British troops, too; veterans of many a desperate field . . .

"Subsequent examination of the field gave a clue to the cause of panic. It was the wonderful accuracy and murderous effect of the American fire. . . . Of those killed an appalling proportion, particularly at the point nearest the lines, were shot through the head."

This was an example of what was, even in 1815, a tradi-

tion of American rifle marksmanship.

In World War I, it was vividly demonstrated during the Second Battle of the Marne when a German division attacked the 38th Infantry Regiment of the 3d Infantry Division. French officers who later inspected the battlefield were impressed by the bodies of 3,000 Germans. One Frenchman observed with Gallic overstatement, "and every one with just one little hole in the forehead!"

A letter found on the body of a German officer after the same battle gave the Teutonic viewpoint, "God save us from these Americans. They kill us like animals with their rifles. They are the best marksmen in the world."

During World War II and the postwar period, the Army tended to substitute firepower for marksmanship. However, the Korean conflict has sharply brought back the need for the old "shoot to kill" tradition. The rugged Korean terrain often makes it a war of man versus man and has earned the conflict the reputation of being "a rifleman's war."

THROUGHOUT the Army there has been renewed emphasis upon a soldier's marksmanship training for what is actually his basic mission—to kill the enemy. Hours allotted to rifle marksmanship during the sixteen weeks of basic training have been increased, since the outbreak of Korean hostilities, to eighty-two hours.

COLONEL JOHN T. CORLEY, Infantry, commanded an infantry battalion in World War II and an infantry regiment in Korea in 1950-51. He is now Chief of the Infantry Section, Combined Arms Branch, at the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces.

American rifleman can again be the best shooters in the world



General J. Lawton Collins, the Chief of Staff, summed up the present feeling when he said, "The primary job of the rifleman is not to gain fire superiority over the enemy but to kill with accurately aimed rifle fire."

Army Field Forces is determined to increase the rifleman's "kill" capability and in recent months has completely revised rifle marksmanship courses. These courses are vitally important in that they measure the effectiveness of preliminary marksmanship instruction and establish the standard for qualification. The modifications of the standard rifle course (which was established by outstanding civilian and military marksmen) reflect the present needs of the

	Standard Old Course		Standard New Course	
Range (Yards)	Rounds	Position	Rounds	Position
100, Slow Fire	8	Standing	No change	
200, Slow Fire	*8	Kneeling or Sitting	**8	Kneeling, Sitting or Squatting
	*8	Squatting or Sitting		
200, Sustained Firing	9	Kneeling, Sitting or Squatting from Stand- ing	No change	
300, Slow Fire	8	Prone	No change	
300, Sustained Firing	9	Prone from Standing	No change	
500, Slow Fire	10	Prone	8	Prone

*The sitting position may be substituted for either the kneeling or squatting position, but not for both.

**Firer's choice.

Figure 1. Comparison of the old and new standard courses
JUNE, 1953

Army—and the same traditions responsible for the remarkable victory at New Orleans.

HOW do the old and the new standard rifle courses compare? Figures 1-5 give the picture pretty completely.

The change in slow fire at 200 yards is for uniformity, as the firer is permitted choice of three positions for sustained firing at the same distance. The kneeling, sitting and squatting positions are fired in instruction practice and then the firer is given his choice of positions in record firing.

The reduction in the number of rounds (from 10 to 8) fired at 500 yards, slow fire, was made to conform to the prone firing at 300 yards. It is believed that the ten rounds at 500 yards was a carry-over from the old Springfield rifle course.

	Old Course A		New Course A	
Range (Yards)	Rounds	Position	Rounds	Position
100, Slow Fire			8	Standing
200, Slow Fire	4	Kneeling	8	Prone
	4	Standing	8	Sitting, Squatting or Kneeling
200, Sustained Fire	9	Kneeling or Sitting from Standing	9	Sitting, Squatting or Kneeling
300, Slow Fire	4	Prone	8	Prone
	4	Sitting or Squatting		
300, Sustained Fire	9	Prone from Standing	9	Prone
300, Slow Fire	8	Prone		
TOTAL	42		42	

Figure 2. Comparison of the old and new Course A

	Old Course B		New Course B	
Range (Yards)	Rounds	Position	Rounds	Position
100, Slow Fire			8	Standing
200, Slow Fire	6	Kneeling	8	Prone
	6	Standing	8	Sitting, Squatting or Kneeling
200, Sustained Fire	9	Kneeling or Sitting from Standing	9	Prone Sitting, Squatting or Kneeling
300, Slow Fire	6	Prone		
	6	Sitting or Squatting		
300, Sustained Fire	9	Prone from Standing		
TOTAL	42		42	

Figure 3. Comparison of old and new Course B

	Old Course C		New Course C	
Range (Yards)	Rounds	Position	Rounds	Position
200, Slow Fire	4	Squatting or Sitting	8	Prone
	4	Kneeling or Sitting	8	Sitting, Squatting or Kneeling
	4	Standing	8	Standing
200, Sustained Fire	9	Kneeling or Squatting from Standing	9	Prone
	9	Sitting from Standing	9	Sitting, Squatting or Kneeling
	9	Prone from Standing		
TOTAL	39		42	

Figure 4. Comparison of old and new Course C

	Old Course D		New Course D	
Range (Yards)	Rounds	Position	Rounds	Position
200, Slow Fire for Old Course D and 1000", Slow Fire for New Course D	4	Squatting or Sitting	8	Prone
	4	Kneeling or Sitting	8	Sitting, Standing or Kneeling
	4	Standing	8	Standing
200, Sustained Fire for Old Course D and 1000", Sustained Fire for New Course D	9	Kneeling or Squatting from Standing	9	Prone
	9	Prone from Standing	9	Sitting, Squatting or Kneeling
TOTAL	30		42	

Figure 5. Comparison of old and new Course D

THESE changes naturally demanded adjustment of other courses. There are four other rifle qualifications courses, grouped alphabetically. The Standard Course is established for 100, 200, 300 and 500 yards firing. However, such a complete range is not always available, so Course A is designed for an installation with only the 100, 200 and 300 firing positions. Also, in some rare cases, time might not be available for firing the complete Standard Course, so this modification would be acceptable. However, Army Field Forces strongly urges departure from the Standard Course only when absolutely demanded by circumstances.

Course B has only the 100 and 200 firing positions, Course C, only 200 yards. Course D is the 1000-inch range, used most often in instructional work previous to firing the Standard Course. However, all three of these can be utilized for qualification if more complete firing facilities are not available, or if there is an acute time factor.

Throughout all courses, the number of rounds fired has been kept consistent with the standard course. Figure 6 shows the firing qualification scores.

TRANSITION firing, which was divorced from known-distance firing in October of 1952, consists of firing at field targets from combat-type positions as well as firing at surprise targets at short ranges. This firing is designed to bridge the gap between known-distance firing and advanced field work. The rifleman now earns his marksmanship qualification on the known-distance range but must confirm it by



successfully firing on the transition range.

This requirement for transition firing now applies to all rifle courses except for Course D. However, where transition facilities are not available, Courses A, B, and C are complete in themselves.

The Quick Fire Course has been redesigned so that it is a real challenge. The ten silhouette targets outlining a man from his head down to about the knees (E type) have been replaced by the smaller silhouette showing the upper shoulders and head (F type).

Three reaction targets have been added—which means the addition of “friendly” silhouettes popping up with the “enemy” silhouettes. When a trainee shoots one of his “own men” he loses points plus gaining some food for thought. Also, two moving targets have also been added which demand quick reaction and ability to “lead” properly.

It takes an alert rifleman to spot and hit all of the targets on this new Quick Fire Course—and its training should pay handsome dividends on the battlefield.

THESE courses assist a rifleman in developing the necessary accuracy but the results are only as good as the thoroughness of preliminary marksman training. Strict adherence to the fundamentals of rifle training (as outlined in FM 23-5, “The Rifle Manual”) and the use of properly qualified instructors will produce competent soldier-marksmen.

The Army is concentrating upon maintaining the high standards now being reached. History, as made at Bunker Hill and New Orleans, and current events, as in Korea, indicate that the American soldiers can hit bull’s-eyes—or aggressors between the eyes.

	Possible Score	Expert	Sharpshooter	Marksmanship
Standard	250	212	187	160
A	250	212	187	160
B	210	178	157	134
C	210	169	148	125
D	210	178	157	134

Figure 6. Qualification Scores

HOW TO USE (UP) MANPOWER

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT B. RIGG

BY the third cup of the fourth coffee call the idea had gained momentum and was ready for recording, even if the recorders were not. A brief, consolidated staff study of only 548 pages was completed after two weeks of formal cigar-smoke arguments in the HQ conference room. While the haze of final battle lingered like an atomic cloud, the manpower-conscious chief-of-staff, Colonel Cutlass, rose to comment on his staff's recommendation. The issue at hand was whether or not to leave the two new special weapons battalions alone (as attached) or form them into a group.

The staff, which sat well above the two special weapons battalions, had recommended that a small, group HQ be formed.

"We must save manpower," said Colonel Cutlass looking downwards through his glasses and thinking upwards towards Congress and his next efficiency report. "I approve the staff recommendation, except as to size. I don't like the plan for an eight officer and ten enlisted man staff HQ. I slash the officer staff by fifty per cent, and hereby eliminate the enlisted men completely. That's final. Let this new one-two-three-four staff function as a streamlined, mobile, fast-moving, simplified, group HQ that can get about almost as rapidly as those special (very secret) weapons they direct!"

The chief sat down, and his staff, less recorder, typist, coffee orderly, S1, and personnel officer, filed out, having learned a lesson in manpower utilization.

"Remember, gentlemen, the heat is on. We've got to cut and cut on manpower. The manpower flap is red hot; we've already lost two

How to build a mobile and modest streamlined staff in the atomic and administrative age

of our best twenty-three typists to higher headquarters. This Army has got to fight . . . men must shoot."

THUS began HQ of Group Zebra. The G1 spent several manpower weeks selecting four good officers for Staff Zebra. The commanding officer was already selected by unanimous approval: he had been the staff member who had given birth to the idea; Lieutenant Colonel Atomage was a man who could see eagles in every coffee cup or cocktail glass.

On the day of Group Zebra's departure Lieutenant Colonel Atomage and his one-to-four staff stood at attention before Colonel Cutlass whose final words were "Don't be slaves to your IN baskets or dictators from your OUT baskets, be mobile—and be off, to the field!"

Thus began Command Group Zebra whose first problem was transportation. The Group's new CP was to be at a point 120 miles distant. Colonel Atomage, had a *carte blanche* order which he waved to get a jeep in order to get to his new post. However, as five men would overload and overweight the new type jeep, he had to requisition two, each complete with driver.

"We'll live off the land, lean on other people's desks and use our hip pockets for IN and our baskets," roared Colonel Atomage as the convoy rolled away.

But Command Group Zebra, now at a forward and isolated CP could not beg or bribe native typists, so a frantic *rwax* went out by the out-of-channels-through-friendship bamboo telegraph, and two freshly cleared Pfc typists arrived.

"Our desks are too far apart," remarked Major Guidemissel, the S2. "It will save manpower for the officers here if we have a messenger orderly."

"Approved," barked Colonel Atomage from the adjacent pillbox-type desk, "send a *rwax* request!"

"Better add a first-aid man," chimed in Captain Ledbucket, the S1, "we will number ten by the time the orderly gets here."

"The aid-man will need a jeep and driver to be effective," added Major Offset, the S3.

"That will increase logistical burden and paper work," said soft spoken Captain Longton. "I'll need at least two more typists."

"I've never argued with mathematics or logistics," grimly remarked Colonel Atomage, "and I feel that when a technical and scientific staff gets large enough it deserves the best in logistical support. Better add a cook to that request. Higher HQ won't mind, they know an army moves on its stomach."

In the weeks that followed the arrival of the new augmentation, the S4 was busy requisitioning IN and OUT baskets of the three-cradle (hold, delay and defer) type. Then a crisis developed: the cook, not



LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT B. RIGG, Armor, is an occasional JOURNAL contributor who also likes to illustrate his own articles, as he has this one. Now on duty in Germany, Colonel Rigg has had a varied military career, including a couple of months of service (involuntary) after World War II as a prisoner of the Chinese Communists.

ORGANIZATION—OR HOW WE GREW



BEGIN WITH A STAFF AND CO



**THIS WILL REQUIRE
TWO JEEPS AND DRIVERS**



**PAPERWORK IS SO HEAVY THAT
TWO TYPIST ARE REQUIRED**



**TO FEED NINE MEN WILL
REQUIRE A COOK**



THE COOK NEEDS KPS . . . THEY EAT SO ADD ANOTHER COOK



ADD TWO MECHANICS



A DOCTOR IS NEEDED



**HE WILL NEED A SMALL
STAFF, CLERK AND JEEP**



**NOW DISCIPLINE BECOMES A
PROBLEM SO GET SOME MPS**



**FOR MORALE GET A SPECIAL
SERVICE OFFICER (WITH JEEP)**

**NOW THE ORGANIZATION IS SO
LARGE IT REQUIRES A NEW
STAFF OFFICER (SS) AND
SOME RIFLEMEN FOR PROTECTION
COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL**

one to go AWOL over an 18-hour day, just threatened plain murderous mutiny unless provided with KPs. "The man is within his rights," judged Captain Ledbucket, the S1. So Colonel Atomage signed and sent an urgent dispatch for four basics, and, after S2 pointed to the CP's exposed position and the need for security, four men were added for a total of eight. Higher HQ approved, but when the men arrived they were without even a corporal. As leadership was lacking an adjacent line unit (not HQ) was forced to lend a noncom.

A few days later Captain Ledbucket squandered an extra fifteen cents and bought Colonel Atomage another coke (soft drinks are always higher in Restricted Areas). This gesture was not philanthropic but with a purpose the S1 explained. "We now number twenty-four bodies and according to AR-7734 we have sufficient strength to requisition a medical officer."

"Can't do it. We must start saving manpower," said Colonel Atomage who didn't like his coke-bribed feeling, and who also felt the S1 had a doctor friend hard-up for assignment.

"But Colonel, think of the health of our HQ; suppose an epidemic of Mongolian-itch breaks out. . . ."

"OK this time, but we've got to stay streamlined and mobile like Colonel Cutlass said."

"That's my next point," said the S1, "the medical officer will need a jeep and driver. Also, to keep him from being a slave to his tin basket paper work he'll need an administrative officer. . . . Just one man and one officer; they'll all fit in one jeep."

"OK you win, I never argue with my staff on technicalities."

"Just one more point, Colonel. We have demanded so many special reports from our battalions that the HQ is overflowing with unfiled papers. We do need a couple of file clerks. It is a mess around here. We've got to be military and keep reports filed."

"I approve of the file clerks."

AS the days dragged on and the staff was urged into a monthly field trip, the need for more transportation was pressed before Colonel Atomage who in a blue-green period of mobile thinking approved three more jeeps with drivers.

After the third practice alert the S1, who was growing tired of being HQ commandant, laid the hard facts before the Commanding Officer at coffee call: "We can't move our CP without at least two deuce-and-a-halfes. On our last

alert there were twelve file cabinets left back in garrison. We also require a HQ commandant."

"Jeeps cannot carry our rations any more," remarked Captain Longton, "it is urgent that we get a truck for ration pickup."

"You are oversimplifying the entire manpower problem," interjected Major Offset, "we've got nine vehicles now of which only three are running. We need two mechanics and a motor sergeant, or we can't keep mobile!"

Captain Longton, taking a logistical reading in his coffee grounds, then sounded off. "Colonel, I agree with S1 and S3, but this will bring our HQ strength up to thirty-nine men and officers. One cook can't work around the clock, we now need an assistant cook because of our increased strength!"

On his one clean cuff Colonel Atomage drew up a manning chart and then concluded, "Our HQ organization is loosely organized and growing along non-military lines. A good first sergeant is now essential. We will be unbalanced if we don't have a chaplain for a group HQ of this size. The mess is just that, without a mess steward to kick the cooks in line. This whole problem deserves serious study."

FOR the next two days HQ Group Zebra labored in conference and discussion at the end of which all previous recommendations were approved. The discussion had been heated and many new points brought up. For example, liaison officers; it was decided three lieutenants were needed, and these parlayed into three more drivers and three radio operators. At this point it was discovered that HQ Group Zebra had no radios or operators for the liaison officers to communicate with, so manpower multiplication had to provide an SCR-399 and operator for HQ.

By the time these men arrived discipline was becoming a problem. With the HQ located in a small village in the provinces, the men, lacking organized recreation facilities and Special Service clubs, bore down on beer drinking in the local taverns and every now and then wrecked one when they couldn't breathe through the suds of a generous head. The incidents grew in number and the local natives put in so many claims that a legal officer became necessary. Of course a provost marshal had to be secured and he was only there three days when the need for town patrol and control made him import six MPs who gave the men such a rough time that morale sagged to a new low

and a special service officer, Lieutenant Overdo, arrived posthaste. Lieutenant Overdo was given the additional duties of athletic officer, postal officer, PIO, safety officer, voting officer, mess officer, utilities officer, recruiting officer, billeting officer, and baggage control officer. This was all right, and he got along with only three men and one jeep. However, the "Don't Waste Garbage" campaign hit high gear and he was made Garbage Control Officer.

The historic case of Lieutenant Overdo is now a mass of detail in medical files in Washington, but his impact on organization is still felt even though the lieutenant has long since been boarded out of the service.

It all began when Lieutenant Overdo was missed at coffee call. All clerks were snowed under with paper work and had long since ceased keeping morning reports, so coffee call became the daily head-count muster formation. As Overdo was listed MIA an immediate search of the area was begun. They found the poor lieutenant in a dazed and raving mad condition in front of a formation of garbage cans which he was trying to drill by the numbers. A psychiatrist was immediately summoned and he stayed so long on the case that he and his eight assistants were incorporated as new slots into the TO&E of HQ Group Zebra. When these slots were under discussion the entire manpower problem was again surveyed and it was found that the piecemeal build-up of personnel in HQ had brought about serious maladjustment and imbalance among the seventy-one men and officers. Higher headquarters sent an investigating board down and its members listened intently for two months to the outcries of overworked cooks, clerks, drivers and mechanics. The board's conclusion was that a new TO&E of 487 men and officers should be drawn up. It was.

COLONEL CUTLASS was promoted to brigadier general for his manpower utilization efforts and Lieutenant Colonel Atomage now commanded such an impressive headquarters, complete with sliding-wall war rooms, that it was decided to promote him to a rank commensurate with his impressive headquarters which shortly thereafter lost its two battalions to two newly created Antarctic corps. Eagle Colonel Atomage had an admirable, smooth-working staff, and as it was considered a shame to let all his manpower go to waste it was decided to rename HQ Group Zebra as Hq Command of Cold Wars on Any Front—and leave it where it was.


THE SHOT HEARD ROUND THE WORLD



MORE PICTURES OF THE 280 GUN

The 280 gun battery (two guns) has nine wheeled vehicles to support it. These include eight 5-ton trucks and one 2½-ton shop van. Two of the 5-ton jobs carry men and equipment. The other six have manerall hoists and ammunition racks. Four of these tow 2-wheel

ammunition trailers; another tows two 4-wheel generator trailers, each of which houses a 30-kilowatt generator. The sixth carries four shell carts. (Pictures courtesy of Steelways, April 1953, published by American Iron and Steel Institute)








The T-10 transporter weighs more than 85 tons and is 84 feet 2 inches long. Each of the two 4x4 units is powered by an Ordnance-designed 6-cylinder opposed type, air-cooled engine with a gross horsepower rating of 375 at 2800 rpm. The front axles of both units are driving axles. The transmission is manually controlled with an Allison four-element torque converter.



The transporter can move forward, backward or sideways and can make a right-angle turn in a 28-foot street. The service brakes are air actuated, internal expanding. The air brake systems of the two chassis are connected and a double check valve in the rear unit's service line makes it possible for the driver of the front unit to control the brakes of both units. A similar hookup controls the throttles of both units.

Production of the big gun was a mammoth task requiring special machine operations and the production of special equipment. The main body, weighing 1600 pounds, was turned, bored, threaded externally and internally, with an accuracy of two one-thousandths of an inch between three bores and one-thousandth of an inch per foot parallelism between axes. A finished product weighing 250 pounds had to be machined from a steel block weighing 1600 pounds. The top carriage of 38½ feet has the largest weldment in the assembly.





**IMAGINATION IS THE YEAST
THAT WILL RAISE THE DOUGH**

New Tactics for the New Gear

COLONEL MELVIN ZAIS


COLONEL MELVIN ZAIS, Infantry, is presently chief of a field training team assigned to the Turkish Army. A member of the original 501st Parachute Infantry Battalion, he served during the Second World War in the 82d Airborne Division as a battalion commander and regimental executive officer. Before going to Turkey he was an instructor and chief of the Airborne Section of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth.

A FRIEND of mine once received a beautiful combination fly and casting rod set. For two days he was lost in dreams. He saw himself wielding this new possession in a Northern stream. Casting upstream and allowing the fly to drift down—stripping line—testing all of the riffles, pools, and quiet eddies that abound in good fishing waters.

The dreams lasted only two days because that's about how long it took him to wake up. The hitch is that he had never used a fly rod, had never fished a mountain stream, and all he knew about stripping line and fishing in riffles and eddies was what he had read in *Field and Stream*. He wouldn't even know a riffle if he saw one. Which brings us to the point.

We read in *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL* or the service newspapers of the various developments which stream through the archives, of the rapid advances that are being made in all the fields of matériel developments. We read about the helicopter and how its potentials are beyond the realm of imagination; about the new antitank weapons which in the hands of a single soldier make the heaviest tank as vulnerable as a fish in a bowl; about the assault aircraft which can land in a peanut patch and the convertiplane which can land on one of the peanuts; about track-laying, all-purpose vehicles which weigh less than six tons and which can mount 105mm recoilless weapons, bazookas, flame throwers or just carry men; about a new light, flat-bed infantry carrier that weighs less than 800 pounds and will go almost anywhere that the doughboy will go, thus taking the load off his back. We read

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



about all these things and we begin to feel the same way as my friend did about his new fishing rod. The first reaction is one of extreme delight and we begin to visualize all the things that could be done with these new developments but again the dream is blocked out by reality. All we know about them is what we read. We don't know how they are to be used in battle.

We can try to find out how someone else has used them or conceived their possible use. But we soon learn that no one really knows how to use these pieces of new gear and weapons or what impact they will have on our tactics and methods of combat. They may be coming off the assembly lines in quantity soon and we will probably superimpose them on our existing organization until our Army will appear to have "grown up," like Topsy.

Is that the right way to do it? Should we not look at our present organization and concepts with a critical eye and with the idea of creating organizations that will fit these developments?

Many bull sessions at which ideas about these new weapons have been kicked around convince me that some of these things ought to be brought into the open where their merits can be debated.

The two items which arouse the most interest and which seem to exert the greatest impact on future warfare (aside from atomic weapons) are antitank developments and the possibility of moving the infantryman and all that supports him by air. As a matter of fact, these two developments are complementary because the development of light antitank

weapons minimizes the restrictions on use of air to move completely equipped ground forces. When we have enough Davids with slings we can leave the Goliaths at home.

IS not our greatest deficiency the failure adequately to experiment with new developments in an atmosphere of pure research and quest for knowledge, unaffected by traditions, preconceived notions and branch pride? New developments fall far short of their potential capacity unless methods for their use are devised and tables of organization and equipment altered to give full use to them. This is not an original idea. The foreword of FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations—Operations*, includes the following statements:

"The fundamental principles of combat remain unchanged, but doctrine and tactics must be modified with each major advance in weapons, transportation, and other devices applicable to warfare. . . . The analysis of the impact of new developments upon the doctrine and tactics of the combined arms must be accurate, constant, and detailed. Military thought must be realistic and alert to modify the doctrine set forth in these regulations in the light of new developments. A considered balance between the conflicting dictates of secrecy and the dissemination of information requisite to the development of sound doctrine of employment must be maintained, if timely realistic employment is to be practicable."

A rejoinder to this might be a statement to the effect that we have effective developmental agencies at Department

of the Army and Army Field Forces levels. There are four development boards which are constantly testing and evaluating new items of equipment and preparing military characteristics. They thoroughly field test every item of equipment that is their responsibility.

But these development boards are often faced with an insoluble problem since a proper evaluation of any weapon is associated with the way it will be used. Recently I saw a letter from a section chief at one of the development boards in which he stated, "Any thoughts or ideas you or others at Leavenworth may have on possible uses of this family of vehicles would be of considerable interest to the Board and to the School in helping us arrive at a logical evaluation of them."

OBVIOUSLY they at their desks and we at our desks are faced with a problem which is almost impossible to solve in an academic atmosphere. Are we to gaze at our navels and come up with some cataclysmic concept, or will we heed the advice of the psychologists and put our subconscious minds to work by repeating the problem before retiring and wake up with the solution? That won't work. We are faced with the fact that concepts and doctrine are affected by the development of instruments of war, and the development of instruments of war is in turn affected by concepts of employment. There is a reciprocal action between the two. Combat has determined everything pertaining to arms and equipment and these in turn have modified the way we fight. That is the whole technique of war: on

the one hand the instruments, and on the other their use.

We cannot adequately develop unless we know the contemplated use and we cannot fully exploit the potential use until we have the development. This paradox cannot endure. Like most positive statements, this one is not completely true. It is not a question of being able to do either one. The question is: how are we best able to compromise between the conflicting requirements and are we doing the best now? The effort expended on technical developments appears to far exceed the effort expended on development of doctrine and techniques. We are out of balance. What can we do to bring back the balance?

FIRST and most important we can establish units (from our existing ZI troop list if necessary) whose primary mission is to field test concepts for employment of new developments. Now we don't mean a unit that will get a new radio and send a squad over the hill to see how far the voice will carry, or will set it under a drain pipe to see how long it takes for it to become waterlogged. Those things can be done by the various test boards. We mean a unit, commanded by imaginative leaders at all echelons, that is given the "go" sign to use the weapons and equipment in a variety of ways, conventional and unconventional. It would be a unit which presumes that nothing is true because somebody said it was. Its mission would be to prove nothing but to discover everything. It would make mistakes and run up blind alleys and there will be plenty of traditionalists who will say, "I could have told them that before they started." But it will also learn a lot for the benefit of the whole Army. Lots of us will not accept ten per cent of what such tests reveal if the conclusions are in conflict with our existing opinions but even the ten per cent of what is accepted may be enough yeast to raise the old dough.

Here are some specific suggestions for testing infantry and armor organization and weapons plus examination of certain possible improvements in our reconnaissance methods.

Infantry

Within infantry divisions and smaller units we should test:

The possibility of substituting recoilless weapons, capable of defeating the heaviest armor, mounted on light track-laying carriers or the new 8-ton airborne tank or a combination of these for the

medium tank and thus eliminating the medium tank company from the infantry regiment and the tank battalion from the division.

The use of helicopters armed with rockets or recoilless weapons which could continue to fire into enemy positions until the last few seconds and thus fill the gap between the lifting of artillery fires and the arrival of the assaulting doughboy at his objective.

The organization of provisional small units within the division armed with bazookas and capable of being assembled from the various subordinate units into a larger force to counteract a major armored threat from a known direction. At present there are over 550 bazookas and 120 recoilless rifles organic to an infantry division but they are spread out so thin that without much planning they can't be employed in mass. The use of helicopters would make possible their rapid grouping and disposition.

The use of light, track-laying, self-propelled antitank guns in the reconnaissance company of the division; such guns are capable of being lifted by helicopter and placed far in advance of the division, thus enabling the reconnaissance company to operate independently for a sustained period of time.

Development of a light, flat-bed infantry weapons-carrier for the jeep which is getting heavier and more cumbersome.

The use of helicopters to move battalions and regiments into the attack to seize critical or otherwise inaccessible terrain, to crossing rivers, to leapfrog units in the attack, to mobilize reserves, to shift units from an unthreatened portion of the front line to the area of enemy concentration and to support all front-line units logistically by dumping supplies as far forward as companies.

The feasibility of a "square" division with four organic regiments. At the post-war infantry conference in 1946 there were many exponents of the square division. Their contention (and a valid one) was that an increase of one regiment in each division would not cause a proportionate increase in the service and supporting troops of the division and would thus make available more front-line infantrymen in the division slice. All who served in an infantry division during World War II will recall attachment of an extra regiment to the division for prolonged periods without a resultant increase in supporting service troops. Most of those who favored the four-regiment concept were airborne veterans who had been required to defend in a perimeter formation. Defense in a perimeter formation dictates

at least four regiments so that at least one regiment can be in reserve. Otherwise two regiments have to defend on at least a 180-degree perimeter and may find themselves fighting in opposite directions at one time. A perimeter defense may not be confined to airborne divisions in the future.

There have been many arguments for separate infantry battalions in a division, each administratively self-sufficient and led by three tactical combat team headquarters. It has been contended that today the division commander fights three regiments instead of nine battalions and thus loses a great degree of flexibility. Granted this could be remedied by attachment; however, human nature is a factor which must be contended with and regiments are reluctant to release battalions to other regiments and are incessantly clamoring for their return. Mobilization training programs do not allow sufficient latitude for a division commander to practice the rotation of battalions between regiments since each regiment is intent on integrating the efforts of its own organic units. Often regiments are retained in reserve when two battalions would be more suitable. Often two regiments are assigned an attack mission and zones which could more appropriately be handled by a four- or five-battalion formation. The requirement for task force organization could be easily met by use of one of the tactical combat team headquarters. Most important however would be the flexibility of mind which would be encouraged by this kind of organization. Why should an armored division be more flexible than an infantry division?

THE reduction of unnecessary overhead to include manpower, equipment and vehicles. The Hodge Board discussed this problem at great length and the general conclusions were that there is much too much fat throughout all organizations and this does not exclude the infantry. Obviously all items not absolutely essential must be eliminated or scaled down. Tremendous emphasis has been placed on creature comforts, though we know that sturdy, self-sufficient men win battles and wars. Many nonessentials may be classified under quantity rather than type. There are many types of equipment which are essential. However, the quantities reflect the desire "never to be caught short." It is impossible to have enough of everything to meet any eventuality and staff planners as well as combat operators must be willing to accept a calculated risk. General Patton once said that "a

man who gave counsel to his fears would never get up in the morning."

Armor

In armor there is a great need for further experimentation in the field of tactics and doctrine and determination of requirements to guide matériel development and production. Consider some of the deficiencies experienced armor soldiers have expressed at one time or another. Tests can be devised which might correct some of the difficulties.

The present armored division is too road-bound because organic administrative support is on wheels. Thus it is directly affected and controlled by the mobility of its logistical support. For example, there are 839 2½-ton trucks in the armored division. Despite armored doctrine and textual insistence that the division is not road-bound there are very few places in the world where the armored division can stray from a good road net.

It is not an economical force. In order to sustain the striking power of 216 medium tanks and 69 heavy tanks it has a strength of more than 16,000—a large number even granting the presence of four armored infantry battalions, division artillery, and a reconnaissance battalion—all designed to support the advance of the tanks.

It is an unwieldy force. In addition to the dragging effect of the wheeled vehicles the tail is all out of proportion to the body. If the vehicles of an armored division were evenly spaced 75 yards apart on one road, the division would extend for 200 miles. If the vehicles of each of the combat commands were spaced 75 yards apart on a separate road, each combat command would stretch for 35 miles. The armored division is as unwieldy as a ten-pound hammer with a forty-foot handle—somewhat difficult to wield.

At a time when the gun seems to have gained ascendancy over the heaviest armor it still uses heavy forty- and fifty-ton tanks.

What can be done about these weaknesses in the armored division and what tests could be conducted to streamline it? The use of aircraft and the effect of antitank developments seem most promising fields of investigation. Would not the use of a few squadrons of assault aircraft or helicopters appreciably minimize the amount of transportation which is now organic to an armored division? If such craft could deliver logistical support from rear bases to using units the division would gain real flexibility and

would not be tethered to a tail so ponderous it can't be wagged.

Suppose these logistical support aircraft are alternately used to lift infantry units which accompany the armored division. One or more infantry battalions could be lifted far in advance of the armored division and there seize critical features (in Exercise Longhorn the 1st Armored Division used light aircraft to move a company of infantry for this purpose). Infantry units could be lifted from rear areas to take over the mopping-up job in cities and congested areas while armor scurried forward to wreak havoc with enemy rear areas. The use of aircraft would release the need for a great deal of ground transportation. One armored infantry battalion now requires 142 vehicles.

Reconnaissance

Many experienced officers are dissatisfied with present reconnaissance procedures in both the infantry and armored divisions and in the separate recon outfits used by corps and armies.

Their dissatisfaction is with the lack of speed and mobility and independence of action of reconnaissance units. In the old days, when infantry was on foot and cavalry was on horses, the horse could travel twenty miles while the infantryman traveled ten miles. The cavalrymen could get out and come back to report or replenish supplies and go out again while the infantryman continued his uninterrupted march. Cavalry was not confined to the road net and if necessary it could live off the country for an indefinite period of time. In these days of mechanized war when the armored divisions are always motorized and the infantry divisions are often motorized, the cavalry reconnaissance outfit is hard put to stay in front of the column it is screening. There is not the proportionate increase in speed that existed between horse and man. If the armored reconnaissance unit does get well ahead—where it belongs—it is dependent on a tenuous, unprotected line of communication to maintain its heavy requirements for logistical support. If it runs into something too big to handle it can pull back and return to its parent unit only if the road net to the rear is secure. It cannot stay and fight, or hole up for a while or dart off in a different direction because it cannot live off the country as could the horse. It cannot participate in forays such as Jeb Stuart made famous. One alternative is for the parent unit to come to its rescue. But this may require a fight in a dif-

ferent direction and locale than the campaign dictates. In essence then, we need lighter, more mobile, faster reconnaissance that is independent of ground lines of communication and can operate an appreciable distance away from the force which it is supporting and for a considerable period.

The answer seems to lie in developments discussed earlier. The integration of lighter vehicles carrying powerful guns and the use of aircraft capable of lifting these weapons and vehicles. Let's suppose that we organized a reconnaissance unit whose heaviest armament was a self-propelled, track-laying vehicle with a 90mm gun, weighing, complete with crew and ammunition, less than eight tons. Suppose we carry our recoilless weapons, our rockets, flame throwers, machine guns, mortars, and infantrymen in light carriers weighing less than four tons. Then suppose we use helicopters to lift this unit 50 or 70 miles to the front and flanks and support them logistically by helicopter. Suppose some of the men fly one-man helicopters which they can continue to use. This unit could fight, get information and harass the enemy to an untold degree. It could be supported logistically by its organic helicopters and it could be withdrawn by air if necessary or it could quickly be moved to another locale. It would possess all the attributes of cavalry which have been sacrificed in this machine age and it would retain the great fire power of the machine age.

IN October 1940, Hanson Baldwin struck at the core of military lassitude when he said:

"Many of our present tactics stem from an age that is gone; the hand of tradition still lies heavily upon our military thought processes. We must renovate our thinking, for our final citadel is the citadel of the mind. It must be broad and spacious and strong, receptive of new ideas."

Although applicable at the time, Mr. Baldwin would be stepping out on a rather shaky limb to make that statement now. Our Army today is feverishly attempting to look to the future in many fields. It cannot be accused of lassitude. But we must be certain that our obsession with the mechanical device does not leave us where we were in 1940. The technological and scientific developments of the past twelve years demand a revolution of our tactical concepts. We must learn to use all that we have and we must be as receptive to new ideas in the field of organization and tactics as we are in the field of matériel.

Get a Prisoner

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES H. HAYES

DURING periods of attack there's a constant flow of prisoners to the rear. But during static periods, the flow is practically stopped. Sometimes in such conditions a raid specifically designed to capture one or more prisoners is necessary.

There was one such raid in 1944 before the Third Army assaulted, isolated and seized Metz, that is typical.

Perhaps a week had elapsed since the division G2 had received a prisoner. But to get an estimate of enemy strength he needed a prisoner.

So the 2d Battalion, 317th Infantry was given the mission of capturing a prisoner. The static and quiet defensive along the Seille River during the preceding weeks, the mined nature of the positions on the opposite banks, the swollen condition of the river because of heavy rains, and the expert camouflage techniques of the German defenders had all contributed to the unproductiveness of previous attempts.


The mission was assigned to a special ten-man patrol. The battalion commander emphasized that there would be no unnecessary haste in the preparation for the operation. A careful and detailed plan would be made to remove the possibility of failure. The stress on careful planning with no unnecessary haste stemmed from a belief that to simply send out patrols in a random fashion with the mission of capturing a prisoner would fail.

The plan provided for the following:

- (1) Reconnaissance to locate a PW (apparent but necessary).
- (2) Thorough reconnaissance of the area of operations by patrol members.
- (3) Preparation of a fire plan to isolate the future prisoner from any assistance.
- (4) An adequate communication plan to control the fire plan.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES H. HAYES, Infantry, served in Europe with the 80th Infantry Division during the Second World War. A 1942 graduate of the Military Academy, he is now on duty at the Pentagon.

Reconnaissance first locates a potential supply. Then you make plans: routes in and out, fire support, communications, transportation. Then you rehearse. And finally you go out and bag your surprised victim.



- (5) Provisions for obtaining, hiding, and using boats to cross the unfordable Seille.
- (6) Some sort of "persuader" to bring the PW back alive.
- (7) Provisions for quickly transporting the PW out of the danger area once we had him on our side of the river.
- (8) Time for a rehearsal of the operation in the rear area under similar conditions of terrain.
- (9) To launch the raid at night for maximum secrecy and surprise.


Approximately eight hours after the word had been passed to the OPs to locate an occupied enemy foxhole, a battalion intelligence team operating from a mill (Le Moulin Fme, see sketch) had located one some fifty yards from the banks of the Seille. The location was verified and the various patrol members were sent to the OP to see it.

Reconnaissance indicated that a covered trail existed from a chateau NW of Clemery to the mill. Reconnaissance verified that jeeps could use the route and that rubber boats could be brought up during daylight to within thirty yards of the river.

Further study showed that a small path on the opposite bank lay to the east of the enemy foxhole. The path could be used to guide the patrol to within a short distance of the objective. A careful study of the opposite bank showed no indications of mines. This fact remained uncertain. It turned out that there were none.

THE artillery liaison officer was called on for assistance in the preparation of a box barrage. The adjustment took place during the day of the operation and was done in as random a fashion as possible to preserve the secrecy. The guns were to fire at a maximum rate for two minutes—on call from the patrol leader. Thereafter, the rate was to be just enough to interdict the area. To protect the patrol the barrages were kept a hundred yards from the foxhole.

To control the fire plan two lines were laid from the 2d Battalion CP to the mill during the night. Provisions were made for carrying the lines and the attached telephones across the river with the raiding force. In addition, on the night of the raid, the communication from the patrol to the battalion switchboard to the artillery was kept open to insure speed in the transmission of messages and requests. An alternate means of communication was provided by an SCR-300 to the 2d Battalion CP. A flare



signal plan was also provided in case of failure of either of the other means of communication even though flares were not a reliable means of communication.

To persuade the prisoner to come along, a large loop of barbed wire with a carrying handle was made. This was to be slipped over the prisoner's neck in case he decided to demur in the request to accompany the patrol peacefully. This bit of lore had come from World War I experience. It proved unnecessary to use the "persuader."

A jeep was spotted in the road from the chateau to the mill with a waiting driver and guard. Additional transportation was spotted for the return of the patrol.

A rehearsal was conducted in the rear area the afternoon of the day the raid was to be executed.

The operation was launched at 2000 hours. The plan worked as anticipated and the PW was safely across the river in less than ten minutes. Within a half hour the prisoner was in the hands of the regimental interrogation team. To plan, rehearse, and execute the raid required about 36 hours. There were no casualties.

Several lessons were apparent.

THE failure of some previous attempts is probably attributable to an understandable desire of higher staff officers to get the prisoner immediately. This resulted in rushing lower units so that they did not have time to prepare a good plan. Time for planning saves time in the long run. Staff officers must not underestimate the time required for smaller units to prepare such operations.

In such actions the most important single item is actually to determine where a potential prisoner is. This is simply the old principle of war applied to a patrol type unit. To simply give a patrol the mission of bringing back a prisoner results in random wandering around in the darkness and more likely than not returning empty-handed.

The plan must be clear and simple.

Once an operation of this type has been accomplished it provides a basis for future plans. A critique at the end will readily bring up details that can be improved. The basic plan need be modified only to fit normal variations of terrain, obstacles in front of the enemy positions, and the number of prisoners desired.

There is no substitute for thorough planning and vigorous execution.

Promotion Solution

Lt. Col. Truly Veritas

An officer's practical ability and theoretical knowledge should carry as much weight as efficiency reports

THE policy used in selecting the recent list of lieutenant colonels for promotion apparently considered eligibles to a cut-off date of temporary rank sometime in 1945. Quite obviously a very large number of those whose date of rank qualified them were passed over by a vigorous screening process.

The bases for selection, or rejection, are not clear, certainly to me. I have heard, on what appears to be good authority, that it was a combination of efficiency reports, age of those eligible, and branch of service. Whatever they were, the list was, as one general officer said to me, "a shocker." When I recovered from the shock of not finding my own name, I began to look for those of my most admired contemporaries who were in the range of eligibility. While several were included, I found several amazing omissions.

I decided to make an analysis based on personal observation and acquaintance. Of those lieutenant colonels I knew whose date of rank made them eligible for promotion, I listed the ten I would consider most qualified on the basis of demonstrated command and staff ability, and combat record. Then I checked those names against the list. Three were on the list. Seven were not! Naturally there were many names on the list that I did not know. Many others I had not seen or observed for years. But many (fifty or more) I did know well, and of that large group only three, in my opinion were in the same class with the seven whose names did not appear.

To check my prejudice or bias, I mentioned these seven names to other more senior officers. Without exception, they considered their acquaintances among the seven as being at or near the top of their list of lieutenant colonels.

I studied the list again. I soon thought I perceived a certain pattern. My seven, while differing widely in most respects, are all highly intelligent officers, with a lot of initiative. They are "operators" who do things and get things done. These qualities include a certain amount of aggressiveness which inevitably results in clashes with some people. Were these clashes reflected in the efficiency

reports of my chosen seven?

Among those on the list that I knew were many capable, efficient officers who would never seek additional work or, indeed, realize that there was additional work to seek. The list, then, seemed to favor the unimaginative but solid man.

Some might suggest that, giving due credit to my natural prejudice in this comparison, these latter would fit in the wholesome category of "intelligent and lazy" officers, while my seven would qualify as "intelligent and industrious" or even "stupid and industrious." If that be so, there are many senior officers who share my lack of objectivity.

WHAT are the consequences of this to the Army? We need not concern ourselves about the feelings of the individual who is not promoted. What does matter is that the Army has, in the past couple of years, promoted men of doubtful qualifications for the rank of colonel, while holding back capable, and even brilliant, men. This policy, being based at least in part on selection, has dealt a serious blow to the morale of some of the best men in the Army.

Something needs to be done. It is obvious that no policy can be found which will be completely fair to every individual. But it is possible to adopt a logical, consistent and comprehensible policy. There can be several solutions. I offer the following as the general outline of one:

Remove the cause for widespread complaint. I doubt if this can be done save by reviewing the list of those passed over, and promoting all who have not clearly and unquestionably demonstrated their lack of qualification. No new policy can accomplish its purpose unless the inequities, or fancied inequities, of the old have been eliminated.

Adopt a procedure (outlined below) which will assure that individual accomplishments and capabilities are clearly recognized as bases for advancement, in addition to the always necessary efficiency reports. Such a procedure should include the following factors:

(1) The ability of an individual to achieve results can be determined easily in command assignments. Combat tests,

command inspections and such can be used without creating more administrative work. Naturally the rating system would have to allow for the case of the officer who inherits a good unit, as well as that of the one who finds himself saddled with a poor one. Similarly it would have to be applicable to officers in subordinate command or staff positions. There are ways to do this. The important thing is that this promotion factor would be based on incontestable facts and figures resulting from competitive inspections or tests, rated on clearly understood and equitable bases.

(2) The theoretical knowledge and capability of an individual can be determined by a written or oral examination. This could take any of several forms, and could be given periodically.

(3) Finally, one-third of the total promotion rating would depend upon efficiency reports. This is not enough to hurt seriously a person who has had a personality clash with a single superior. Yet it is sufficient to assure adequate recognition of the individual's ability or inability to get along with, and to satisfy the requirements of higher authority.

When the policy is adopted, it should be published so that all will know where they stand.

If it should become necessary to change the policy, let those affected know how and why; and before, not after.

THERE are probably other schemes that would work as well or better than these. I have undoubtedly been influenced by the fact that such a scheme would have clearly recognized measurable improvements which took place after I took over my last command (and which were ignored, I suspect, by higher authority). Whether or not such recognition would have affected my failure to appear on the last promotion list, I can't say. But under such a policy I would know the factors that were considered. And most important, I would know that my promotion would depend on my proven capabilities, as well as on efficiency reports, in comparison with similar records of fellow officers of like grade and service.

An unusual spy story: The work of the Army's CIC that
sticks to facts—without loss of the thrills that chill

Battle Underground

THOMAS M. JOHNSON

THE neither short nor simple annals of military history frequently ignore the important fact that the battle above ground, between armies and air forces, is usually preceded and accompanied by a hidden battle below the surface of accepted events, between secret intelligence and counterintelligence, which frequently influences the outcome of the battle above ground. And pursuit of that truth to its ultimate foxhole affords sidelights on history that are illuminating, surprising, even rather exciting.

As, for example, the story of the two battles that were fought when the 6th Army Group, the American Seventh and the French First armies, crossed the upper Rhine and thrust into the heart of Germany. The battle above ground is well known, but not so the battle underground which was a struggle between spy and counter-spy that is scarcely excelled in unpublished achievements of American secret service. Its cunning thrust and counter-thrust began with the macabre mystery of the master spy buried in a lonely wood, continued through many adventures like those of the spy for the Americans whom Hitler decorated, and ended in the great military victory above ground.

But before that successful climax, our spy hunters had to meet a serious chal-

lenge when, in the chill autumn of 1944, American and French forces scaled the Alsatian mountain crests. They looked down upon the most celebrated river-defense line in all Europe, behind which lurked the waiting *Wehrmacht*. Before the Allies could force a crossing to the Rhine's east bank they must regroup forces and replace heavy losses from fighting just ended, and from frostbite, flu and trench foot just beginning.

At this ticklish moment the German

military intelligence launched an artfully-planned large-scale undercover operation. It was a potentially dangerous plan to disrupt our build-up and ascertain our plans for the Rhine crossing. Deceitful even in its name, *Abwehr*, which means defense, this doubly offensive organization had left the whole region we had just entered fairly crawling with "stay-behinds." These were secret agents in every disguise or none, with carefully memorized cover-stories to account for

A German spy, tried and convicted by a court, is blindfolded by an American soldier before facing a U. S. firing squad.



THOMAS M. JOHNSON is a longtime collector and writer of true "spy" stories. He was a war correspondent with the AEF in the First World War and later wrote a book on the AEF's battles. His interest in spies and saboteurs led to the collection of many stories of the work of U. S. intelligence and counterintelligence agents in World War I. These appeared in magazines and later were gathered into a book: *Our Secret War: True American Spy Stories*. His first appearance in *Infantry Journal* was in 1933 with a spy story. Another appeared in 1936, and in 1941 in collaboration with Fletcher Pratt he wrote the story of World War I's "Lost Battalion." This is his first appearance in *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*.

themselves if questioned. Most were Alsatian traitors to France, including criminals released from jail, who blended into their background like copperheads among autumn leaves. Some were former Gestapo torturers and bloodhound trainers; most dangerous were a sprinkling of veteran *Abwehr* agents. All had been coached as saboteurs and spies.

Immediately after we moved in, they were to emerge from their hiding places. The saboteurs were to strew our roads with infernal machines cunningly designed to blow up our trucks or puncture tires, and to plant bombs resembling lumps of coal in our locomotive tenders. The spies had been taught to recognize our units by shoulder patches and vehicle markings. They were to report American movements and preparations to operators of portable radio sets who also were left secreted behind our lines. These would flash their reports, by code and wave-length agreed upon, across the upper Rhine to the waiting *Abwehr*.

THE plot failed because of the Counterintelligence Corps. This unique semi-secret outfit comprised mostly former lawyers, detectives and newspapermen, but welcomed such oddities as a bibliophile musician, a mountain climber, a midget-auto racer and a tropical-disease specialist, if they possessed the special cold courage and ingenuity required of the soldier-operative. The Corps kept the Army's secrets from enemy spies, and in so doing, saved more American lives than anyone except, perhaps, the medics.

The CIC had reached Alsace on the heels of the retreating Germans, bearing a grab-list of residents the French reported had helped the enemy during their four-year occupation. But CIC soon found this list didn't begin to reveal the menace to our security that Alsace held. They found they had to trap and nail to the barn door a superlatively verminous lot of Nazi agents. But the trapping took shrewdness and patience. It began with linguists of CIC and its French equivalent, *La Service de Sécurité Militaire* (SSM), systematically pumping loyal French and Alsations for information of the disloyal and of their German seducers, and noting it upon cards which were rushed to the forward detachments.

MANY were delivered that November, 1944, to a small hotel on the *Grande Rue* of Remiremont, a small town amid the Vosges Mountains. Outside, a swinging sign blazoned a rampant *Cheval de Bronze*, but the Bronze Horse had quiet-

ly become headquarters for the 206th CIC Detachment. Behind locked doors and black-curtained windows the Corps assembled its agents, of assorted ages, racial origins and appearance, some wearing uniform without insignia, others in various guises and disguises. The dining-room had been converted into a laboratory for spy-detection by introducing photographic equipment, file cabinets and a swelling card index. From this latter Major Henry Carter, a quiet man of intelligent aspect, drew a white card bearing a red check. He handed it to a tall, dark youth whose muddy o.d. bore no betraying mark.

"Here's an ace," he said. "Bring him back alive so we can pump him. Hurry!"

Special Agent Paul J. Morton read the typewritten legend:

TALLEMANN, FRANZ: Age 53; height 6 feet 2 inches; thin, eyes gray-blue, hair gray; clean-shaven; face intelligent, even refined. Wears dark clothing, high collar; neat and precise. Distinguishing feature:



"The Duck"—Lieutenant Raoul Canard of the French military intelligence. "Lingerie? Of a perfume? Bon!"

limps on right leg. Alsatian-born; in German Army in World War I. Afterward came to Remiremont as schoolteacher. Suspected pro-Nazi before German invasion in 1940. Afterward became *Sturmabfuhrer* in Alsace Storm Troopers and important informer for Gestapo. Suspected of extensive espionage. Public Enemy No. 1 of Remiremont area. Hobby: sketching. Look for woman angle.

What proved to be one of CIC's most macabre mysteries confronted Morton. Born 26 years earlier in Marquette,

Michigan, he had lived mostly in France and Belgium, whose languages he spoke. Now he hurried through streets rejoicing at *la liberation*, to French *Gendarmerie* headquarters.

"Talleman?" repeated the chief. "That *salaud de traître* fled just before you Americans came. I'll take you to his house."

The substantial building near the *Mairie* had clearly been abandoned hurriedly. Its fireplace was filled with ashes of burned papers, but in the library, still intact, were many charcoal sketches of churches and cathedrals in French and German frontier towns, unsigned but dated in the late 1930s and early 1940s.

"Then the Nazis came," pondered Morton. "He didn't need to make any more of his 'sketching trips,' first to Maginot Line strongpoints, then to Germany to deliver the notes hidden under the sketches. An old spy strick, but it worked."

"Here's that woman angle," said the chief, producing filmy undergarments, delicately perfumed. "She was petite, chic, lived here with Talleman. I don't know her name, but once I saw her with a fat man with bristly hair and glasses, Dr. Heinrich Schultz of Plombières."

"A lead already," rejoiced Martin as he drove to that quaint resort town. He found it thronged by young *Maquisards*, preparing for an execution.

"*Un vache de Nazi*," they said. "A Doctor Schultz."

"Let me have him," exclaimed Morton. Then he explained: "Before you slaughter the 'cow,' you must first milk it dry."

Under his skillful questioning, the quaking Schultz admitted having been Talleman's go-between with Alsatian informers, especially girls he bribed or blackmailed into disclosing hideouts of *Maquis* leaders. Then the Gestapo caught, tortured and shot them. Yes, Talleman had done more important undercover work, but of that Schultz knew nothing. Where was Talleman? Schultz hesitated, then when pressed, said the fleeing spy was probably saying good-bye to Julie Frapelle, his French mistress in nearby Luxeuil.

"*Cherchez la femme!*" gloated Morton. "And for that work—the Duck!"

So CIC dubbed their clever SSM collaborator Lieutenant Raoul Canard, who listened fascinated to Martin's story.

"Lingerie?" he exclaimed. "Of a perfume? Bon! A Luxeuil!"

Julie had returned there, they found, but the *Maquis* had beaten and jailed her. She was *petite*, indeed, but her small body showed bruises and cuts



These two Alsatians in the service of the Nazis came to untimely ends at the hands of CIC officers. The girlish-looking sixteen-year-old boy at the left had the duty of reporting to German intelligence on the operations and methods of U. S. counterintelligence traffic check points. Though not lacking in gallantry, CIC officers were extremely realistic about the designs of German-inspired maids on men in olive drab. The sweet-faced babe on the right was arrested for using her womanly wiles to get information from innocent U. S. officers in search of momentary diversion from the strain of combat.

through torn clothing; though scarcely *chic*, for the *Maquisards* had shorn her dark hair. Still, even though grotesquely bald, pale and haggard, she remained a woman, attractive and faithful. She was Tallemann's, body and soul; she would tell nothing to endanger him.

"If the *Maquisards* catch him," Canard urged, "they'll kill him on the spot. But we will give him a fair trial. Come! Help us to find and save him!"

"He sent word he was escaping to Spain," Julie hesitated. "He would bid me farewell—in forty-eight hours—at the *Taverne des Vignerons*, thirty miles away."

THE spy hunters hurried there. They found no Tallemann, but a tall, weapon-laden youth wearing a tricolored armband: Lieutenant François of the *Maquis*. He told them excitedly that the Commandant of his outfit, one Varennes, had been locked in the "*violon*" at Remiremont by his men for ordering them into a suicidal attack on a stronger German force. The innkeeper interjected:

"This same Varennes shot a Gestapo officer and escaped, but Tallemann betrayed to the Nazis four of Varennes' friends and his wife. They shot all four and Varennes' wife died in concentration camp of pneumonia. Varennes vowed to skin Tallemann alive."

François started to speak, then obviously restrained the impulse. With a wink to Morton, Canard proposed to the *Maquisard* that they have some wine. Mor-

ton quietly left to question Varennes.

He found an unshaven, dark man who, appearing strangely suspicious of this American ally, protested he never had known that *maquereau* Tallemann. He's lying, thought Martin. Furious, he returned to the inn.

"*Enfin*, this one," Canard nodded toward François, who sprawled snoring across a table, "and wine—have told me the truth. It takes us all back to Remiremont."

When they arrived there, Varennes again excitedly denied knowing Tallemann, until suddenly François confronted him.

"You killed Tallemann!" the *Maquisard* accused. "When you sought him to get vengeance, I followed you. You came up with him on the edge of a wood near Remiremont. When he saw you, he tried to run, careening on his left leg. You ran after him. . . ."

The memory seemed to snap Varennes' weakening self-control.

"I overlooked him!" he screamed. "I taunted him! '*Fumeur!*' '*Vendu!*' I emptied my pistol into his black heart! He folded like a jumping-jack whose string has broken. With my helmet I dug in the mud, and buried him."

"You should have brought Tallemann in alive," said Morton sternly, "to reveal to us his agents who are now menacing the safety of our armies. But . . . eagerly . . . 'those agents' names and whereabouts are in his little brown notebook. Did you get it? No? Take us to his grave—now!"

They drove at François' direction to a dark wood of fir trees. Varennes pointed to a heap of earth and leaves.

THEY began to scoop at the pile. Their hands came away brown with mud, also with blood, coagulated upon the gaunt figure in sedate black that they uncovered. Wiped clean, Tallemann's face even in the wan light of early dawn bore an expression strangely peaceful. The only hint of violent death was the tightly clenched right hand. But opened, it revealed nothing. So, from the master spy's stiff body the spy-hunters stripped his pedagogue's suit, but they found neither notebook, papers, nor money. They tore off the underwear and beheld the reason for Tallemann's limp. His lower right leg was an artificial one, strapped to his knee. Martin cried:

"Take off the leg!"

Canard unfastened it. From the knee-socket dropped a leather tobacco pouch. Martin snatched it, drew forth rolls of French francs, German marks, British five-pound notes. Then he shook the false leg. Out fell a small object, square, brown—a notebook! Quickly he flipped the pages.

"Writing—but in code," he muttered anxiously. Then he cried: "But it's an *Abwehr* code that we've broken—and can read! It proves Tallemann was no mere Gestapo stool-pigeon. He was a big shot in German military Intelligence—the *Abwehr*! But look! The methodical Heinie schoolteacher—he wrote down the names and addresses of his agents!"

The dramatic unearthing of the little brown book proved to be a great find for American and French Counterintelligence. Its pages were dealt out like playing cards to Allied agents and yielded veritable canastas of enemy agents hiding in Alsace-Lorraine. Throughout the area raiding parties sneaked up on the hideaways it listed, and found many of them still occupied. Some occupants were the usual small fry: waiters, chambermaids, prostitutes. But there were lawyers, politicians, a few corrupt French officials, a large manufacturer whose "salesmen" ranged Alsace gathering information on French *Maquisards*, and now on incoming Americans. These prisoners, and others corralled through information furnished by loyal French, were interrogated and their stories checked against one another.

Immediately it became clear that, to confuse us and more safely to contact one another, many stay-behinds were now moving about our rear areas, especially of the Seventh Army. To keep them away from the new headquarters where the staff were planning the Rhine crossing, Lieutenant Colonel Kent Cornell purged the vicinity of possible disloyal civilians, arranging with the loyal to give warning of strangers or suspicious happenings. He forbade entrance to all persons without passes. He established at 225 road crossings, bridges and other likely places, checkpoints where civilians must show passes. Their type was changed irregularly to befoul the shapely monocled Baroness Von Wochum who, prisoners said, directed experts who supplied *Abwehr* agents with counterfeit passes. Civilians with no passes or the wrong kind were searched and held on suspicion of being spies or saboteurs.

The second word especially sent a chill down CIC's collective spine. Saboteurs! An immediate, creeping menace to the bridges and culverts we were repairing to carry the trucks and trains full of supplies and arms we needed to force a Rhine crossing, to the new supply and ammunition dumps that also were tinder for torch and bomb. Strong guards were set and all CIC checkpoints were alerted:

"Look out for seeming refugees with lumps of coal in their pockets."

THEN began a general laying on of hands upon all who sought to pass, and especially those who looked lumpy. It became none too gentle when the lumps on certain Alsations were found to conceal black objects of the shape and size of coal. The laboratory pronounced the shiny exterior to be a tarlike covering

for a hollow interior that contained a clever chemical time-charge that would explode some time after the fake "coal" had been placed in piles of the genuine article either in dumps or in locomotive tenders. The explosives might have tied up our railroads in Alsace-Lorraine as effectively as a strike ties up those in America. How many of these infernal machines and men trained to use them were already behind our lines and about to be placed where they would do the most harm? How could that be prevented? As CIC pondered, a checkpoint reported:

"We got a human torpedo! Sixteen small coal bombs in his pockets! Plays dumb, but is bright enough to know he's on a spot. Maybe he'll talk."

CIC rushed up a clever French Alsatian interrogator, and the prisoner talked. He had been head of an Alsatian pro-Nazi cell, and could identify and describe several *Abwehr* officials, including the German sabotage troop leader who had trained him. The description was so good that scarcely had it permeated the 225 checkpoints than the German himself was captured and on the grill. Sizzling questions and accusations made it so hot for him that presently he said:

"Let me have a pencil—and a map."

He proceeded to mark the location of every bridge, dump or building that the *Abwehr* had scheduled for wrecking by explosive or fire, including some that had been charged before the German retreat and now needed only to be detonated. But not knowing that CIC now knew these plans, the *Abwehr* continued to send agents to try to carry them out. Shabbily clad as any in the battered, footsore procession of refugees, they came to our checkpoints with varied stories containing truth sufficient to make the untruth very hard to detect. But CIC took no chances, questioning, searching. In a hip-pocket of an apparently innocent youth, blond as many Alsations, they found a flashlight. Harmless enough—but when someone pressed the button, out shot a beam of green light.

"It's a signal light," said Special Agent Woolworth W. Frank and he took the flashlight and the now jittery prisoner down to the west bank of the Rhine. He flashed the green light toward the east bank, time after time. Then through night and mist appeared a phantom boat, in which a dark, stooped figure plied muffled oars. Drawing his revolver, Frank crept forward. Suddenly the prisoner shouted toward the boat:

"Amerikaner hier!"

Then he bolted.

In one motion, Frank whirled and

fired once. The prisoner fell. Completing his whirl, Frank emptied his revolver at the boat. There was a little splashing as the oars sank into the water, but then, to the CIC agent's dismay, the boat was swallowed again in fog and darkness.

At dawn they found it stranded on our bank of the river, beside a clump of trees. Searching through these, they bumped into a body dangling from a limb. It bore a bullet wound apparently not fatal, but serious enough to cripple the man. Yet he had managed to hang himself with his own belt. He must, they thought, have been tremendously determined to die. Why?

"This is the Alsatian's pal," CIC deduced. "Frank's bullet made him lose the oars so he couldn't steer the boat and it drifted to our bank of the river. Rather than be captured, he hanged himself. And here's why: The *Abwehr* teaches agents it sends on important missions that they must kill themselves rather than be captured, tortured, and made to tell all they know. Some don't do it—but some do; really desperate Nazis on really vital missions. Now what was this man's mission?"

Frank hurried to the hospital where his wounded prisoner had been taken. Although the blond youth was shocked by news of his partner's suicide, it took long questioning to make him even hint at the secret for which the dead man had given his life rather than reveal.

"All I can tell you," he said faintly, "is search—search—down a well."

French hurried back to the Rhine, and with all the help he could muster from CIC, MPs and GIs, combed the region where the agent had landed for wells. He found one—old and deep and dark. At the bottom were heavy packing cases. Hauled to the surface and broken open, they disgorged what seemed to be enough lumps of explosive coal to have blasted the Alsatian mountains into valleys. In fact, this proved to be the *Abwehr's* entire reserve supply. It had been hidden behind our lines, for saboteurs who had used up those lumps they had brought through in their pockets, and also for others who had come through with none of the tell-tale objects, or had stayed behind with supplies that would need replenishing. Seventh Army CIC received official commendation for "forestalling a serious wave of sabotage."

This is the first of two articles on the Seventh Army's Counterintelligence Corps detachments in World War II.

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

WHAT'S BEING DONE ABOUT IT?

(Continued from Page 13)

distort and perhaps destroy any positive steps that may be advanced.

General Bradley deserves credit for inspiring the JCS paper that is reproduced here and the members of the JCS deserve credit for adopting it as an official expression of their concern for the future of the nation's fighting forces.

Mr. Eisenhower deserves credit for putting the tremendous power and prestige of the White House behind the movement for better service conditions. This was not a simple thing for him to do. As the Chief Executive of the United States he must be circumspect at all times so that neither political opponents of his party nor enemies of the "military" can charge him with undue favoritism to his own profession. Some will attack him on those grounds in any event but it is good judgment on his part not to give these segments of society too many opportunities to cry out in alarm. We think Mr. Eisenhower must be very conscious that a "General in the White House" can do more harm than good if he tries to do too much for the military profession.

THE strongest possible support for the services must come from civilians who are familiar and concerned about the growing unattractiveness of military careers. It would be a distinct service to the nation if some of the distinguished leaders from the professions and business and industrial worlds would gird for the battle by forming a non-political committee that would fight for the servicemen, who must largely remain mute and aloof from this struggle that so vitally affects them and their families. There are many able men in civilian life who know these problems and who have the organizing ability to put across an effective program that would make the facts clear to all the people: Mr. John J. McCloy, for example, a former Assistant Secretary of War and High Commissioner to Germany; and Brig. Gen. David Sarnoff of RCA who has only recently headed a committee that studied these problems; former President Truman would certainly lend his support as would distinguished members of the Republican Party. And the country is teeming with lawyers, doctors, teachers and business men who have served with the Army, Navy and Air Force and who know from experience that the Regulars are indeed the vital and necessary leavening that gives direction and meaning to the military power of the United States in time of war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff can labor to enhance the services and every soldier, sailor and airman can do his bit. But the strongest weapon—the only effective weapon—is an aroused and informed citizenry. We hope such a group appears spontaneously, free of any hint of being Pentagon "inspired," as were the local committees for UMT that were formed a few years ago.

LETTER FROM PARIS

NATO Turns to Atomic Tactics

WHEN General Matthew B. Ridgway, in a terse press release from SHAPE, announced that he was starting a series of atomic indoctrination courses for Allied commanders and staff officers, the defense of Europe took a new, but not unanticipated, turn. For the first time, the defense plans of a geographical region will include the benefits of atomic developments, as they modify classical and conventional strategy and tactics. That it would do so was heralded many months ago in guarded discussions by U. S. officials.

The big questions, still unanswered, are: Does the atomic factor mean more or fewer ground divisions and combat support units? Undoubtedly it will mean fewer tactical attack airplanes. But will it mean more or less air power, including interceptor types?

Ridgway's school does not go so far as to answer such questions. The courses will be held in the U. S. zone of Germany, conducted by U. S. authorities, to acquaint allied officers with the use of atomic weapons in tactical situations. Undoubtedly the instruction will include defensive tactics, including all the information normally given civil defense authorities. How quickly can troops move into an atomically-bombed area? How long can they stay? What measures can be taken to protect troops from atomic attack? What are the best methods of attack and exploitation following an atomic attack? Will atomic bombs call for greater dispersal of defending troops? What will be the effect of atomic radiation and blast on armored

units? Infantry units? These, and many other questions, will have to be studied by the commanders and key staff officers if they are to effect any changes in the requirements of approximately 100 divisions and 10,000 aircraft needed for the defense of Western Europe.

Two types of courses are to be planned: a 4-day course for general and flag officers, and a 10-day course for key staff officers. Neither will include any information which is classified as "Restricted Data" in the Atomic Energy Act.

General Bradley cautioned a NATO press conference that "optimistic estimates concerning the availability and effect of atomic weapons could mislead some nations into thinking that not all of the NATO forces planned for 1952-53-54 need be provided and trained. Such thinking would not be justified. No tested knowledge of atomic weapons to date indicates any reason to let up in our efforts to build up our collective security forces to at least those we are planning for the next few years."

It is known that General Ridgway's headquarters was asked to prepare a study on the effect that new weapons, including atomic, and new developments might have on the strategic defense of Western Europe. The report is due in the Standing Group for consideration sometime this summer or early fall. This will be the first defense-plan study to include the effect of atomic weapons on modern warfare—especially in their tactical application.

S. NIPERS COPE

TO THE EDITORS . . .

(Continued from Page 10)

best battalion on the post. Then he goes on furlough.

When he returns, he is put on overseas orders, they break the platoon up, send some one way, some another, and keep some behind. So much for Team No. 1, to say nothing of morale.

When he gets overseas, he is assigned to a unit with a few other men. He will be there three or four weeks before he becomes part of that team. But platoon-size units are rotating five to six men a month and there goes Team No. 2. When 2,000 men are rotating from a division each month, where is your team or morale?

I have been in the Army since 1940 and I know (and most of your readers will bear me out) that the officers and noncoms who have worked with the

men through basic would put more into the training of the men if they knew that the men would be going overseas together as a team, and that it would be their platoon and company.

I think that this could be worked out to the good of the Army. Rotate company- or battalion-size units thirty days before the unit shipping date, DS officers and key NCO's to the unit that is being rotated so that when the unit arrives they will have firsthand information of SOP, terrain and other essentials. Rotate personnel without equipment; when they get there they can take over the equipment of the unit they are replacing.

SFC FREDERICK R. CHILDS
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Irons in the Fire



Radar Boresight Telescope




Aremac Associates have announced the development of a new unit designed to provide a rapid, accurate and convenient means of calibrating and checking radars. The elbow-designed optical instrument incorporates a ten or fifteen power prism-lens system.

Missile Generator

AiResearch Co. is now producing an exceptionally compact AC generator for airborne use. Weighing only four and three quarters pounds, it is less than half the size of the standard automobile generator. Because of its storage qualities, it is well suited for use on missiles, thus replacing heavier short-lived batteries. Designed for utmost simplicity, this AC generator turns out 800 watts, 115/200 volts, three phase, 400 cycles. It is extremely rugged and has passed tests of a 50 G shock and 40 G acceleration and has operated successfully at 50,000 feet.

Portable Smoke Generator



A new smoke machine—the M-3 Pulse Jet Smoke Generator—is being produced by the Evans Products Company for the Chemical Corps. Weighing 125 pounds, the generator is about the size of a small trunk and can easily be carried by two men. The generator uses gasoline and oil to spread a penetrating blanket of white mist from three nozzles. The unit is self-contained and battery-powered.

Battery Vest

Walkie-talkie radio batteries have a bad habit of "conking-out" in sub-zero temperatures. To combat this, the Signal Corps has experimented with a flexible battery vest containing 117 pockets for as many small (pencil-stub size) dry cell batteries interconnected by small flexible wires, forming the equivalent of the standard batteries for the radio. The vest, manufactured by B. F. Goodrich, weighs little more than three pounds and uses the body heat of the soldier to maintain a much higher degree of energy than standard batteries under similar conditions. The battery vest furnishes power to both the receiver and transmitter and is interchangeable with the standard battery.

Turbo-prop Transport

The new Lockheed C-130 turbo-prop is the latest thing in military air-transport. Built to fly at low speeds and low altitude for parachute drops or high altitude and high speeds for long-range flights, the C-130 has many adaptations for Army use. It can fly up to 20 tons of cargo. A strong, foot-thick floor, a pressurized cabin with heated floor and walls are just some of the newer innovations in this military transport. The four engines are Allison turbo-prop-jet engines harnessed to turn propellers. The Army had a big hand in setting up the requirements for the C-130 and consequently many desirable features developed from previous transport use have been incorporated into the plane.

Tank Retriever

A new 50-ton streamlined giant, called the T-74 Tank Recovery Vehicle, is now going into quantity production at the Bowen-McLaughlin-York Co. Specifically engineered to support the latest model medium tanks, the T-74 is capable of towing damaged tanks across country as well as hoisting and winching tanks out of mud or deep ditches, and when the need arises it flips upright an overturned tank. Hydraulically operated winches provide sufficient hoisting power to pick up and carry medium tanks. A front spade, designed to stabilize the retriever for extremely heavy lifting or towing, can also be used to improve on-the-site terrain if adverse ground conditions are encountered. What's more, the retriever crew can do the job from inside the tank without exposure to enemy fire.



FRONT AND CENTER

THE President's plan to reorganize the Department of Defense is going to have hard sledding in Congress although his Executive Order is a positive action that can be overruled only by action of Congress. If Congress doesn't act against the proposal by 30 June the President's reorganization will stand. We plan to present analysis and discussion of the reorganization in this magazine next month.

EXPERIMENTAL tests of the organization of the infantry regiment are under way at Fort Bragg with a regiment of the 82d Airborne Division acting as the guinea pigs. The tests are designed to see if the regiment can increase its fire power and defensive strength while reducing its overhead strength. Among the tests are: 11-man squad; elimination of the battalion heavy-weapons company, merging it with the headquarters company and transferring its heavy machine guns to rifle companies; adding four—for a total of eight—105mm recoilless rifles and eliminating the two 75mm rifles; adding three 81mm mortars—for a total of six—to each battalion.

THE use of the hip and crouch positions in firing the M1 rifle has been discontinued in training. Instead the rifleman will fire aimed shots from the shoulder. At short ranges—30-35 yards—he will fire while moving forward. For longer ranges he will stop to fire his aimed round. Army Field Forces directed

the change in order to eliminate faulty techniques used by recruits during assault firing problems. The change is not expected to reduce the volume of fire but will certainly increase the accuracy of fire on known or suspected enemy locations during an assault.

THE infantry rifle squad (including airborne) has improved its fire power potential a great deal with the addition of another BAR. Each squad will now have two BARs.

THE planned reduction of the number of training divisions to six from the present ten could conceivably result in higher-quality training. With fewer training cadres the Army can be more selective in choosing officers and noncoms for this all-important duty of training new men. As long as the Army's strength is to be stabilized at or near its present level, replacements can be trained handily in six camps. There is a good argument that more savings could be made in the same field by eliminating or consolidating some of the technical services' training centers. And while the Army has succeeded in ridding itself of a number of the battalion and regimental posts that are a relic of the horse-cavalry days, a number of such still exist and could possibly be eliminated (if political pressure, always prevalent in these cases, could be overcome). Among the smaller posts closed or soon to be closed are Fort Hancock, N. J.; Fort Huachuca, Ariz.;

Forts Worden and Flagler, Wash.; and Fort Custer, Mich. Indiantown Gap, where the 5th Training Division is located, is one of the larger reservations to be closed. Fort Drum, N. Y., and Camp Cooke, Calif., have already been inactivated. Other training division posts that may be closed are Camp Breckinridge, Ky. (101st Airborne), Camp Roberts, Calif. (7th Armored), and Camp Chaffee, Ark. (5th Armored). The Navy has closed down a part of its Naval Training Center at San Diego, Calif. The Air Force has not closed down any installations but several bases it was planning to activate may be washed out by the cut in Air Force funds.

THE Court of Military Appeals has ruled that you can be guilty of cowardice "in the presence of the enemy" even though you are miles from the front lines. It made the ruling in the case of a corporal who, while returning to his front-line combat company, refused to go beyond a friendly artillery position then engaged in firing at the enemy. The court ruled that "in the presence of the enemy" was not a matter of definite distance but of "tactical relations." It noted that, for example, a member of an anti-aircraft gun crew in position where an enemy air attack might be anticipated could be guilty of cowardice "in the presence of the enemy" even though the position was many miles from the enemy lines.

THE NEW TEAM OF MILITARY CHIEFS



ADM. ARTHUR W. RADFORD
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
To succeed Gen. Bradley in August



GEN. MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY
Chief of Staff, Army
To succeed Gen. Collins in August



ADM. ROBERT B. CARNEY
Chief of Naval Operations
To succeed Adm. Fichteler



GEN. NATHAN F. TWINING
Chief of Staff, Air Force
Successor to Gen. Vandenberg

The conduct of war is a matter of common sense and strength of character

The of War

Major General H. W. Blakeley

IN any field of activity technical know-how is all-important at the lower levels of supervision, but becomes less and less important in higher executive positions. This is just as true in the running of a war as it is in the management of a great corporation. Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, and Chiang, the top Allied strategists of World War II, could not have pooled their very considerable talents and, without training, officered a battery of artillery, a submarine, or a bomber.

However we may define strategy, its principal ingredient is common sense. Most authorities define it as the large-scale planning and directing of military operations, but others hold that strategy exists only in the mind of the commander and all else is tactics. If common sense and clear thinking are the prime elements in strategy, the junior officer ought not to feel that it is something beyond his ken.

The much quoted (and little read) Clausewitz was very definite about this matter over a century ago. He declared that acquaintance with military affairs was not the principal qualification for a master strategist. "A remarkable, superior mind and strength of character" were more important he believed. Abraham Lincoln was the perfect example of this. In the crucible of war, he developed into

a better strategist than any of his generals, and incidentally established the forerunner of our present system of command. It was not because he was a civilian, though, that he achieved superior leadership. It was because he had "a remarkable, superior mind" and unusual strength of character. Hitler, in spite of the early successes of his bold and unorthodox strategy, lacked these qualities.

"The Principles of War" is a term that scares off many people—soldiers, sailors, and airmen included—and with some reason. For one thing, not only have the military schools of the great powers never agreed on the true principles that should guide all operations of war, but in our own armed forces we at one time even had a *different number* of principles being taught in the Army and in the Navy. It made no difference that the principles are usually described as "immutable." The War Department, some thirty years ago, did get a little red-faced when it published "Changes No. 1" to its "immutable principles."

There is no intention to be academic here about the fine points of the ideas which have guided successful leaders since warfare got beyond tribal disputes with stones and clubs. As weapons and communications and means of transportation change, the *expression* of these principles will obviously vary from concepts produced before we reached our present state of so-called civilization complete with atomic bombs.

Almost all authorities agree that the vital principle, the one upon which all the others depend, is the **principle of the objective**. This simply requires selection, at the outset of a campaign, of a specific, realistic, tangible goal, attain-

ment of which will compel the enemy to conform to our will.

General Eisenhower's mission in 1944 was to "enter the continent of Europe, and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces." The objective of the first phase of his operations was to secure a lodgment area which was to include airfield sites, the port of Cherbourg and the ports of Brittany. Here was a specific, tangible goal which compelled the enemy to go on the defensive and eventually to conform to our will.

IN Korea, we have a very different picture. Initially, General MacArthur's mission was, according to testimony during the Congressional hearings, "to clear Korea of the enemy and to make of Korea a free, united, and self-controlled nation." The objective, then, was to overcome the North Korean forces and liberate the entire country. Speaking of the time when the United Nations troops had occupied nearly all of Korea, MacArthur said: "Our victory was complete and our objectives within reach when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces. This created a new war and an entirely new situation. . . ." Initially, we had a specific, tangible goal, but it became unrealistic when the enemy that we sought to compel to conform to our will became not the North Koreans but the Chinese Reds, and perhaps Russia. Our worldwide objectives, defensive in character unless another world war is forced on us, affected the objectives in Korea. From the Joint Chiefs' viewpoint, the world situation required that the Far

MAJOR GENERAL H. W. BLAKELEY, Retired, a graduate of the War College and a former instructor at both the Field Artillery School and the Command & General Staff College, served with the 5th Armored Division and the 4th Infantry Division during World War II. Since his retirement, he has written extensively on military affairs both for professional journals and civilian publications.

The Pearl Harbor disaster exemplifies at least three principles of war. For the Japanese, Pearl Harbor proved the validity of the principle of surprise. For the United States it was a lesson in the disaster that can befall when the principles of unity of command and security get little more than perfunctory observance.

East commander's primary mission, after the Chinese intervention, should become (1) not to let the forces under his command in Korea be cut off and destroyed, and (2) to protect Japan from attack, including of course direct attack from the Soviet Union.

Security of war plans and perhaps of cryptography, plus changing conditions, make it uncertain as this is written exactly what General Mark Clark's current objective is, but it must be more specific than the announced mission "to defeat aggression and to restore peace." Red China is the principal enemy, in the militarily active sense, but it is unlikely that General Clark's objective is one which if attained "will compel the enemy to conform to our will." It follows that we are not conforming to the principle of the objective in the Far East, but that, in spite of casualties and elapsed time, we are in fact engaging in a "police action." Politically, in the broadest sense of the word, the present policy may be correct. If we hadn't stopped aggression when and where it started, we probably could not have stopped it at all. But militarily the policy results in something close to frustration. And when we lack a decisive objective—the "what" factor in war—the application of the other principles dealing with "how" to accomplish a basic mission becomes increasingly difficult for the military men who must apply them.

It should be emphasized that the principles of war must be applied at each command level. The objectives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II were different from those of any one theater commander. In the Normandy landings, Montgomery's objectives as commander of the ground forces were



different from those of any of his subordinate commanders, and the objective of a battalion in an attack will differ from that of the regiment of which it is a part. But at all levels, the principles of war should guide the commander as he goes through the routine of estimate of the situation, decision, plan, orders, and supervision of execution of his orders. Common sense and good judgment are more important at the Chief of Staff level than technical know-how. Down at battalion it is often the other way around.

Looking back at the top level of strategic decision during World War II, was the inclusion of "unconditional surrender" in the Allied objectives wise? The militarily untrained civilian who doesn't know an LCI from an LCT can reach his own opinion on such a question. Or consider Korea. Clausewitz gave some good and applicable advice: "Be generally strong, then be strong at the decisive point." The United Nations are becoming "generally strong." Is Korea the decisive point? Yes, if victory there results in no further aggression. No, if the Communist decision is to hit in western Europe. Here is a vital military decision that depends only partly on technical military knowledge.

LET us look at the application of the "how" principles in the light of the Korean campaign. Right up at the top of our Army's list of these is the **principle of simplicity**. This looks to the use of concise, understandable plans and orders to facilitate correct execution, and retain at the same time the flexibility essential to meet changing conditions. In Korea, our better educated personnel and superior communications permit rapid shifts of fires or troops to meet new situations, but if the plans or orders should be permitted to get too complicated, disaster might easily result. Winston Churchill said of the Japanese during the last war that "the rigidity of the Japanese planning and the tendency to abandon the object when their plans did not go according to schedule is thought to have been largely due to the cumbersome and imprecise nature of their language, which rendered it extremely difficult to improvise by means of signalled communication." The same limitations apply to the Chinese. They *must* practice simplicity. If they violate the principle, they will create chaotic situations for themselves. In our own forces,

the individual replacement system requires more emphasis on simplicity than is necessary in the case of well-trained, professional troops moved in and out of the zone of operations by units.

Unity of command is a principle which has had tough going for reasons all the way from personal vanity to honest disbelief that a commander from another country, another service, or even of another arm within a service, had the necessary familiarity with techniques and personnel to function effectively as an all-over commander. From these objections came a tendency to favor cooperation over unity of command. Modern military thinking, however, tends toward the idea of a single commander to ensure decisive application of the maximum power of all available forces toward the objective.

In Korea, we did not have it initially, because the Republic of Korea troops were not under the Allied Supreme Commander when the campaign began. Even the American Military Mission of some 500 officers and men in Korea was functioning under the State Department. As MacArthur put it: "My responsibilities were merely to feed them and clothe them in a domiciliary way. I had nothing whatever to do with the policies, the administration or the command responsibilities in Korea until the war broke out." The present setup with a United Nations Supreme Commander over the air, sea and land forces of all the allied nations is a perfect example of unity of command. His missions come from our Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Lincoln, searching for competent commanders during the darkest days of the Civil War, saw clearly the value of unity of command. "How much depends," he exclaimed, "in military matters on one master mind."

The principle of the offensive calls for grasping the initiative at every practicable opportunity. It sounds simple, but was it clear before the event that MacArthur's assumption of the offensive when he made the wide amphibious envelopment that struck at Inchon was a "practicable opportunity"? Obviously not. Basically, the principle of the offensive is important because objectives cannot be obtained without offensive action. Defense can never achieve decisive results. Defensive combat has only two justifiable purposes: either to gain time pending the development of more favor-

able conditions for undertaking the offensive, or to economize in men, weapons, and ammunition in one locality while concentrating superior forces for a decision somewhere else.

Clausewitz had a good comment on this subject: "A swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive, the flashing sword of vengeance, is the most brilliant point in the defense."

STATIC warfare not only fails to get results, but it is hard on fighting spirit—the French Army at the end of the "phony war" period of World War II is a good example. The **principle of maneuver** calls for organizing and positioning our forces so as to be able to achieve superior strength at the decisive point. The Inchon landings on the west coast of Korea, accompanied by a frontal attack up the Korean peninsula and an east coast landing at Changsa-dong, were modern versions of the classic double envelopment designed to result in a battle of annihilation. Much bunk has been written about this plan as a mark of General MacArthur's military genius. It was a standard solution of the problem as it existed. It would have probably been turned out by at least half the class at any of our upper military schools. Writing in the military weekly *Armed Force* before the event, I said: "A landing on the west coast not far south of the 38th parallel would make it easy to seize the assumed objective (the 38th parallel) and, at the same time, contribute to the destruction of the enemy forces by cutting off the northward retreat of his main body. . . . The troops already ashore in the Pusan beachhead, preferably reinforced, would put on a holding attack, and a small force, perhaps a regimental combat team, landed somewhere up the east coast would be useful to create a diversion."

The MacArthur plan, then, was not "brilliant." What was extraordinary was MacArthur's good judgment, courage and decisiveness in the face of objections from many of his advisers and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The best that Admiral Doyle, who was to command the Amphibious Group, could say was that "Inchon is not impossible." Accounts of the final command conference before the invasion indicate that MacArthur took the full responsibility, and indeed convinced most of his initially skeptical hearers of the probability of success.

Two principles of war very closely re-

lated are the **principle of mass** and the **principle of economy of force**, sometimes called a little more precisely, economy of forces. Victory requires the concentration of superior forces, of "mass," on the ground, in the air, and on and under the sea at the decisive places and times. In order to achieve this superiority, there must be economy of force in other places. Here is a real test, not only of good judgment but of leadership and character. The commanders of the theaters designated as secondary ones naturally exert every effort to get more troops,

ordinations of communications, the control of military intelligence, and the administration of captured areas—this creation was an example of the application of the principle of unity of command even though the command was in the hands of a group rather than in an individual's. Some major problems, of course, went up to the President and Prime Minister for decision, but they firmly supported the basic strategic decision.

Leadership and firmness are just as much required at the tactical level. A regimental commander in Korea with

attack is the problem, success in the main operation will more than compensate for failures elsewhere.

Surprise as a principle of war is important, intriguing, and considerably misunderstood. Surprise has been a powerful element in successful attacks in the whole history of warfare. Lee achieved it at Chancellorsville when, after Hooker had made a wide envelopment of his left flank, he, in turn, split his small force and sent a part of his command under Jackson in an envelopment of Hooker's envelopment. Hitler

Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta. On the highest national and international levels, the principle of the objective requires far-reaching decisions by the chief executive of the government or governments. A coalition can be successful only if the partners are honest with one another and if its overall objective can be attained without doing violence to the political and social aspirations and needs of the separate states and their peoples. Yalta failed because Stalin used deceit, subversion and propaganda against his wartime allies.



planes, ships and supplies. The commanders in the Pacific and in Italy when the invasion of France was being given priority in World War II felt that they were not getting adequate means to fulfill their missions. The pressure on the Combined Chiefs of Staff—the control group that directed strategy for the United States and Great Britain—was tremendous. On their advice, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill had decided right after Pearl Harbor that, as General Marshall expressed it in his Biennial Report of 1945, "our resources would be concentrated first to defeat Germany, the greater and closer enemy, and then Japan."

Incidentally, the creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to control for both nations the strategic direction, the allocation of manpower and munitions, the co-

two battalions in line and one in reserve who decides, in planning an attack, that he will make the main effort with his left battalion, giving it priority for artillery and tank support and for air strikes, while his right battalion makes a "holding" attack—that is, one that will hold the enemy in position and prevent his identifying the main attack and putting in his reserves against it—will invariably have a visit from the secondary attack commander who will have excellent arguments for switching "just one tank platoon" or a slightly larger share of the artillery preparation from the main attack. If the regimental commander doesn't stick to the principles of mass and economy of force, he may have his whole attack thrown back because he was not "strong at the decisive point."

Whether a world war or a regimental

achieved it when he struck through the Ardennes in 1940 and in 1944. The Japanese certainly achieved it at Pearl Harbor. So did the Allies in their raid on Dieppe, even though they were repulsed as was Hitler in his second drive through the Ardennes—the Battle of the Bulge.

Perhaps it is not too academic to say that surprise is not merely launching an attack at a time and place not expected by the opponent; it is rather the attainment of the objective of the attack before the defender can move his reserves to prevent success. The Inchon landing was probably foreseen by the Communists before it actually occurred. The plan was not, apparently, a well-kept secret, and the loading and movements of some 260 ships could hardly be kept from the knowledge of the Reds. But it

might be argued with reason that the landing was nevertheless a military surprise in that it was pushed home before the enemy could shift his forces to meet it.

Surprise, whether it is considered as a principle of war or in connection with giving your wife a surprise party, is achieved by secrecy of preparation, deception ("Looks as though we'll be out on a night problem on your birthday"), new methods, and speed of execution. In war, new weapons and the use of terrain that seems to impose great difficulties (the Ardennes has been an example several times with decreased surprise each time) might be added to the list, but the underlying idea is the same.

THE principle of security, the other side of the surprise element in war, includes the whole organization for securing and evaluating information of the enemy; security forces such as outposts, and air and sea patrols; correct estimates of the enemy's capabilities; and constant readiness for action. Pearl Harbor is an example of failure. A more recent and quite different example of the application of the principle of security was when the Joint Chiefs of Staff changed General MacArthur's mission in the Far East, as previously mentioned, after the Chinese Communist forces intervened and further intervention by Soviet forces seemed not unlikely. At that time, the former Supreme Commander has testified, he was informed that "my primary mission involved the preservation of my forces and the security of Japan." Security considerations here affected the objective.

LET'S go back for a moment to one of the earliest wars ever fought. It cannot be documented by after-action reports, but it probably went about like this. Uglub was the strongest and smartest of the eight warriors of a tribe which had lost nearly all of its women by accident and sickness. The Zumbo tribe in the next valley had many attractive young women, but it also was a strong tribe with over twenty men of fighting age. Uglub and the other warriors of his tribe got into a big argument over what to do about the situation. He convinced all but two that the thing to do was to kill enough of the Zumbo warriors so that the others could be easily cowed, and the women could be seized. The two who disagreed with Uglub

came around to his way of thinking when he grabbed them by the backs of their necks and knocked their heads together. Unity of command had been achieved, and an objective selected which was specific, realistic, and tangible and which when attained would compel the enemy, male and female, to conform to the will of the victors.

After a noisy war dance with much beating of drums, the eight warriors, armed with clubs and stones, moved slowly and directly to the main pass between the two valleys. They had lost the advantage of surprise because there had been no secrecy, no deception, and no speed, and when they were in the middle of the pass they were jumped by sixteen of the Zumbo warriors who not only had a two-to-one advantage, but had hidden themselves so that when Uglub's group walked into the ambush the enemy fighters formed a circle around them.

Uglub, who hadn't been doing very well so far, now, under the stress of the emergency, applied several principles of war promptly and correctly. He decided that the only hope for his party was for it to get out of the ring of club-waving warriors which surrounded it, and get out by the way of the trail back to his camp. There were only three of the enemy on this trail, and Uglub with five men attacked them, a two-to-one advantage in Uglub's favor, while two of his men protected his task force from attacks from the rear. The whole group made a quick breakthrough without losses and got free, killing three of the enemy in the process. Uglub had employed correctly the principles of the offensive and the mass. The two men who provided protection for the attacking group exemplified security and economy of force. Uglub had been strong at the decisive point. He was lucky in that the enemy, who lacked a strong leader, didn't pursue. Luck helps in war as it does in football, poker, or love.

A few days later, Uglub and his warriors stole swiftly through the jungle by a roundabout route while the women and children made much noise along the trail. Seven of the Zumbo warriors were up in the pass, and Uglub's group had little trouble in killing the surprised ten who were sleeping in the enemy camp. Then a quick attack up the trail took the guardians of the pass in the rear, and Uglub achieved his objective. He had applied most of the principles of

war although he never, to his dying day, heard of them.

SINCE the days of Uglub, life in general and military operations in particular have become much more complex, and the squad leader of today has to decide how to use his automatic weapons, know what mortar, artillery and air support is going to be available and how it is to be used, and be familiar with communications, gas defense, and even the precautions to take if the enemy uses atomic bombs. All this is technical knowledge, some of which will certainly change within the year, but the principles of tactical employment that worked when Uglub used them are just as necessary for success today as they ever were.

Uglub was not limited in his actions. There was no threat of some great and ruthless tribe intervening if he crossed the mountain into the enemy's valley and attacked his main camp. Limited war is not new, however, but it has usually been an economy of force measure, temporarily pursued until victory in the major theater was attained, or forces and supplies accumulated, or perhaps the strain of defense wore down the enemy. In the Korean situation, the main theater from the viewpoint of global strategy is western Europe; and it is not only inactive but the national policy is to keep it inactive short of an enemy offensive; forces and supplies are reasonably adequate; and there is little sign of an enemy collapse from internal causes. Tremendous strides in communications and mobility have made limiting a military operation more difficult. It is much harder to limit the Korean campaign than to keep the Battle of Gettysburg within a few Pennsylvania farms.

General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a recent speech summed up the Korean situation this way: "We usually start our military operations when we have built up our strength and are ready to launch an offensive. But in Korea we were in the scrap before we were militarily ready. We started with less than an infantry battalion when the South Koreans had their backs to the wall. We opened up on the offensive. When we have to fight, we Americans like to fight on a big scale, with plenty of elbow room. However, because we did not want to enlarge the war unnecessarily by bombing in Manchuria, we have tried to fight the war in a limited area. The decision not

to extend the bombing to Manchuria and China was taken after long and careful thought. It was felt that the results would not be decisive; that such attacks might incite hostile bombing behind our lines or might bring on a general war. It has given some a feeling of frustration that we have withheld part of our air power. Americans felt like a fighter who does not really have enough room to swing. We have withheld what people consider our Sunday punch—the atomic bomb—because strategic bombing to be effective must be aimed at the source of supply. And we all know that the main source of Communist supply is not in China. There is no guarantee that air power in any of its dimensions would be decisive. An air attack by the United Nations on China might possibly trade the small deadlock in Korea for a larger stalemate in China. Even with our war limited to Korea, however, we proved to the enemy that his aggression was not successful."

When it comes to the problem of global strategic planning—in distinction from current military operations—the application of the principles of war in the event of another world-wide conflagration is easier because the limitations which we have imposed on ourselves in an effort to avoid such a calamity will be gone.

Understanding by the people of our country of the necessity of operations which conform to sound principles even at the cost of not being able to take action, even defensive action in American territory, may well be vital to eventual success. Amateur strategists and political interferers have caused military disasters all through history, not because they were ignorant of military techniques, but because they unknowingly advocated violation of the principles of war.

Jomini (a protege of Napoleon), whose book, *The Art of War*, had considerable influence on our Civil War commanders, had this to say: "The only reasonable theory of war is that which . . . admits a certain number of regulating principles but leaves to natural genius the greatest part in the general conduct of war, without trammeling it with exclusive rules." War, like everything else, is more complex than it was when Jomini wrote those lines nearly one hundred and fifty years ago. If he were to rewrite them today, he would probably emphasize the importance of the "certain number of regulating principles."



The allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 was in itself a triumph of the power that can be achieved at a decisive point by applying the principle of mass. But that concentration would not have been possible had not the allies obeyed other principles of war. First was the principle of the objective—the decision that Hitler's Nazi empire was to be destroyed before full power would be brought against the Japanese. Second was the principle of unity of command—the U. S. and Great Britain (and the other allies) merged all forces under a single headquarters and commander: SHAEF and Eisenhower. Third was the principle of the offensive—the evils of Nazism could only be wiped out when the military power of the German nation was destroyed and allied armies occupied the German heartland. There was nothing simple about the massive and intricate structure of SHAEF's forces, but when developments demanded the exertion of the principle of simplicity the gears were adjustable—as when First Army and 12th Army Group changed their plans to take advantage of the unexpected capture of the Remagen bridge.



FROM THE SCHOOLS

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

Heavy Mortar Officer Course

The Infantry School will open its first Infantry Heavy Mortar Officer Course in July. The new five-week course will train officers to command, supervise and direct the fires of infantry heavy mortars in support of combat elements. Upon satisfactory completion of the course an MOS as a fire direction officer (1188) will be awarded.

The prerequisites for the course are: (1) Must be a commissioned officer on active duty or a member of a reserve component whose assignment, actual or anticipated, is to an infantry heavy mortar battalion. (2) Must have credit for the Associate Infantry Company Officer course. (3) Mathematical background to include algebra, trigonometry and slide rule is desirable.

New Platoon Leader Course

TIS will also start a new ten-week Basic Infantry Officer Course for newly commissioned second lieutenants in July. Emphasis will be on teaching basic Infantry weapons and developing the junior leader's ability to command a platoon both in combat and garrison.

Students will be recent graduates of the United States Military Academy, ROTC, battlefield commissioned officers, and newly commissioned officers of the National Guard.

Japanese Officer Training

The training of Japanese National Safety Force Officers will begin in May. The training is being conducted at the request of the Japanese government and will last for about five months.

Korean Officers

Fort Benning is now training its fourth special class of Korean officers for the Republic of Korea Army. The officers receive extensive training in weapons, tactics, logistics and operations. Upon completion of the four-month course they return to their homeland where most will assume the duties of platoon, company and battalion commanders in the ROK Army, or instructors in ROK Army service schools.

THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

FSC Circular

A new training circular on coordination of fire support has been prepared by TAS and forwarded to OCAFF for approval. This draft circular replaces TC 23 (3 August 1951). It reflects current thought and

recent experience on fire support principles with certain doctrinal changes and elaborates on the organization and functions of fire support coordination centers. Also delineated are the responsibilities of commanders, staffs, and representatives of fire support agencies with respect to fire support coordination. Particularly noteworthy is the clarification of the artillery officer's status and function as fire support coordinator.

New light is shed on the problem of the physical location of the FSCC and FDC with respect to the supported unit's CP. The FSCC is located at the force (supported unit) CP; the artillery FDC where

necessary to best control the fire of its elements.

Flexibility in the composition and establishment of the FSCC is stressed. Functions of individuals in the FSCC are varied to fit the particular situation. As a general guide applicable to all combat echelons, the FSCC at division level is described in detail in the circular.

The objective of fire support coordination is restated with new emphasis. It is to achieve maximum effectiveness in the use of fire support without adversely affecting any of the present methods used in obtaining rapid delivery of fires essential to operations. As an example, a forward observer continues to request immediate fire from his battalion directly, not through the FSCC. Similarly, if the artillery S3 desires immediate additional artillery fire, he requests it of the next higher field artillery echelon. The FSCC is usually not involved in this type mission.

The method of presenting the plan of fire support has been improved. The commander's concept of the maneuver and supporting fires is now presented in paragraph 2b of the operation order. The fire support portion of the concept is reflected and amplified in the fire support plan annex to the operation order. The fire plans of individual supporting elements, such as artillery, navy, or air, are included as appendixes to the fire support plan annex when appropriate.

New Technical Bulletins

Department of the Army technical bulletins now going to the field prescribe procedures for bore sighting, testing, and operating fire control equipment.

These bulletins point out that laying for elevation using the gunner's quadrant on the leveling pads of the breech ring is incorrect because the accuracy of the setting is affected by the elevation of the tube and by cant of the trunnions. When using the gunner's quadrant at the higher elevations, errors are usually introduced when the quadrant is reversed to set elevations greater than 800 mils. As specified in current artillery training literature and as emphasized in the technical bulletins, elevations should always be set on the cross-leveled elevation scales unless they are known to be inaccurate.

Another cautionary note provided by the technical bulletins is for the cannoner setting elevations to coordinate his actions with those of the gunner so that before he calls, "set," he observes that the gunner has laid the gun on the aiming posts or point. Any movement of the gun in deflection will generally throw the bubbles off level and requires that the gun be readjusted in elevation. Conversely, if a change in elevation is made after the gun

REUNIONS

1st Armored Division. 28-30 August. Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C. For details write: 1st Armored Division Assoc., 1529 18th St. N.W., Wash., D. C.

3d Armored Division. 23-25 July. Milwaukee, Schroeder Hotel. For details write: Secretary, 3d Armored Div., 80 Federal Street, Boston 10, Mass.

8th Armored Division. Bellevue-Stratford Hotel, Philadelphia. 3-5 July. For details write: Henry B. Rothenberg, Room 1008, 33 N. LaSalle St., Chicago 2.

24th Infantry Division. St. Louis. 14-16 August. For details write: J. Peyton, 131 N. Culver St., Baltimore.

27th Division. 9-10 October. Syracuse, N. Y. World Wars I and II. For details write: National Headquarters, 27th Div. Assoc., Box 1403, Albany, N. Y.

37th Division. 5-7 Sept. Mayflower Hotel, Akron, Ohio. For details write: 37th Div. Headquarters, 21 West Broad Street, 1101 Wyandotte Building, Columbus 15, Ohio.

75th Infantry Division. Washington, D. C. 14-16 August. For details write: John D. McBurney, 5822 E. 14th St., Kansas City, Mo.

83rd Infantry Division. Hotel Hollenden, Cleveland. 20-22 August. For details write: Headquarters, 83d Inf. Div. Assoc., 1435 Clark Street, Pittsburgh 21.

94th Infantry Division. Hotel New Yorker, New York City. 23-26 July. For details write: Bernard Frank, Reunion Chairman, Commonwealth Building, Allentown, Pa.

is laid for direction, the gunner should re-check the centering of the telescope mount bubble and the alinement of the sight with the aiming posts (point) before calling, "Ready."

The bulletins received to date (TB 9-325-8 and TB 9-331B-1) indicate that the first step in the bore sighting procedure is a check of the elevation scales to insure that an elevation set on the scales coincides with the elevation of the tube when the bubbles are level. This check would be performed at zero elevation for those guns that can be depressed to zero and at the minimum obtainable elevation for those that cannot be depressed to zero. The key to accurate bore sighting is the use of a tested gunner's quadrant and the regular performance of the prescribed basic periodic tests.

Simultaneous Observations

The mission of corps artillery survey is to establish common survey control for the artillery with the corps to facilitate massing of fires. The most important element of this control is direction.

The Department of Observation, TAS, is now teaching a technique which will aid considerably in establishing common direction in a minimum of time. This technique, descriptively called "simultaneous observations," is based on the assumption that the lines of sight of several instruments are almost parallel when sighted simultaneously on the same celestial body. Once the azimuth of one of these lines of sight is known, the azimuth of the remainder can be determined by applying appropriate corrections for the horizontal displacement of the instruments. Thus, the artillery with the corps may be furnished common direction in a matter of minutes once the instruments are set up and communications established.

Astronomic Survey Course

An astronomic survey course was begun at TAS on 27 April. This course is to train survey officers and enlisted members of the field artillery missile battalion to perform the field work and make the computations required to obtain an extremely accurate azimuth by astronomic means. Students in this course must be trained survey officers or trained enlisted survey specialists.

TAS Catalog

A new Artillery School Catalog of Instructional Material has been published recently. The purpose of the catalog is to —(1) Provide a reference index to instructional literature and training aids prepared for resident instruction by The Artillery School; (2) provide a list of miscellaneous school and training supplies and professional texts available for purchase from TAS Book Department; and (3) provide instructions for ordering the above items from the Book Department by those individuals and agencies authorized to purchase. The price of all items is included.

INFANTRY SCHOOL INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIAL

The following new instructional material suitable for non-resident as well as resident instruction may be ordered from the **Book Department, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.**, at the prices shown. (The COMBAT FORCES Book Service regrets that it cannot handle orders for these pamphlets.)

Helpful Hints for Rifle Marksmanship Instructors, Assistant Instructors, and Supervisors. Pertinent comments on observations of officers of The Infantry School who recently toured training divisions in the Zone of Interior. These observations and comments pertain to Rifle Marksmanship and are offered for your information and guidance. 10¢.

Mechanical Training, M1 Rifle and Carbine M2. No. 1103. Proper methods in care and cleaning, operation, stoppages, immediate action, effect of wind, sight changes and use of the score card. General data and mechanical training of the M2 Carbine. 4 hours. 10¢.

Preparatory Rifle Marksmanship, Rifle, Cal. .30 M1. No. 1125. Basic principles of preparatory marksmanship, sustained fire exercises, adjustment of binoculars. 4 hours. 10¢.

Mechanical Training, Cal. .50 MG, HB, M2, Ground. No. 1306. Disassembly and assembly, functioning, headspace adjustment, and use of headspace and timing gauges. 2 hours. 10¢.

Technique of Fire, 57mm, 75mm, and 105mm Rifles. Nos. 1781 and 1782. Techniques of direct fire, indirect fire, and fire from position defilade. 4 hours. 10¢.

Rifle and Weapons Squads in Offensive Action. No. 2043A. Tactical employment of the rifle and weapons squads in offensive action. 2 hours. 15¢.

Recoilless Rifle Platoon in Attack. Nos. 2091-2091A. Organization and duties of personnel, selection of firing position areas, tactical employment, and supporting fires. 2 hours. 15¢.

Battalion in Attack, Use of Reserve. No. 2229. Tactical employment of the reserve battalion in attack, to include: plan of attack, attack order, subsequent actions and orders. Principles of employment. 4 hours. 35¢.

Tactical Employment of Artillery. No. 2655. Mission, capabilities and limitations, types of fires, tactical missions, coordination with the supported arm, duties of forward observers and liaison officers, and fire planning. 2 hours. 10¢.

Military Correspondence. No. 6512. Preparation of military correspondence, channels of communication, the operation of the correspondence file, and the types of routine orders. 3 hours. 25¢.

Personnel Procedures. No. 6521. The commander's responsibility for the personnel procedures of classification assignment, promotion, and the career guidance and career management programs. 2 hours. 15¢.

The Aggressor Army. No. 6601. Purpose and use of Aggressor Army as an aid in adding realism to field exercises, CPXs, small unit problems, and map maneuvers. 1 hour. 10¢.

Order of Battle. No. 6608-A. A discussion of order of battle to include definitions, techniques, maintenance of records, and practical work. 1 hour. 10¢.

Safeguarding Military Information. No. 6641. Classification, handling, and safeguarding of documents and military information. 1 hour. 10¢.

Counterfire Organization and Technique. No. 6649. Counterfire operations to include: means and methods of locating enemy weapons, counterfire organization, counterfire weapons, shelling reports, and the importance of rendering these reports promptly. 1 hour. 25¢.

Operation Plans and Orders. No. 6921. Principles of operation planning as applied to the infantry regiment and battalion; to teach the types, characteristics and format of the operation order; and to provide applicatory problems in the preparation of written operation orders. 6 hours. \$1.25.

★ BOOK REVIEWS ★

NEAT BUT NOT CONVINCING

WINGS FOR PEACE: A Primer for a New Defense. By Bonner Fellers, Brig. Gen., U.S. Army, Ret. Henry Regnery Company. 248 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.50.

"This book will shape national policy!" says the publisher's blurb. Perhaps it will. An Army general outdoing de Seversky as an advocate of strategic bombing by land-based aircraft is certain to attract the attention of politicians, columnists, and editorial writers. And this is particularly true when the general writes with the clarity and persuasiveness of General Fellers.

The *New York Times* review summed up the book with a headline, "The General Wants More Planes." The *Saturday Evening Post* based an editorial on it. Constantine Brown devoted most of a column to quotes from the book, and various editors are finding it a good source of material for advocating an increase in Air Force strength.

Mr. Brown, incidentally, incorrectly identified General Fellers as an infantryman. Officially, Fellers was a coast artilleryman until he became a general officer in 1942, but actually he was a staff officer during much of his service. In several staff capacities he was closely associated with General MacArthur, and after retirement was for a time with the Republican National Committee. It is not surprising that he emphasizes that Secretary of State Dean Acheson had stated that our defensive perimeter in the Pacific ran through the Aleutians, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands and the Philippines, that "doubtless the Korean Reds would not have struck had they known the United States would intervene," and that neither the Joint Chiefs nor General MacArthur had ever contemplated the commitment which President Truman ordered of ground forces on the Asiatic mainland.

These comments are in a chapter called "U.N. Containment-East" in the first part of the book, a part devoted, in the author's phrase, to "telling the worst" about our "present military realities." He goes on to point out, in a chapter called "No Containment-North or South" that "it is a towering reality that aggressive Russia is confronted by no effective barriers on her northern and southern borders."

It is on the subject of "NATO Containment-West" that General Fellers is most vitriolic. He believes that a more erroneous conclusion could hardly be reached than to believe that NATO forces now constitute a real war deterrent, and that therefore Moscow has been compelled to give up the idea that western Europe could be invaded. On the contrary, he says, "Europeans have little confidence in NATO's old-fashioned and hopeless war plans," and the Kremlin, grasping this fact, will endeavor to turn Europeans against

the United States, encourage them to relax their defense preparations, and to nurse their national grievances. Europeans can then be terrorized into a choice between total devastation by air strikes and a Red Army sweep to the Atlantic, or neutrality.

"Under these circumstances," General Feller says, "Americans who believe in justice and fair play and in Europe's civilization, could hardly ask our Allies not to seek neutrality." Elsewhere, he says that "American planners must consider the possibility that to survive Great Britain might be compelled to be neutral." The question naturally arises, when this line of argument is advanced, whether Russia is likely to permit neutrality. "Neutrality" might well turn out to be enslavement.

Much that General Fellers says about the difficulty of NATO's defense task is undoubtedly correct, but he ignores or brushes off the difficulties on the Russian side of the picture; their probable inferior mobility; their long supply lines; the doubt about the Soviet fighter's effectiveness in an aggressive war in contrast to his tenacity in defense of his homeland; the NATO forces' intimate knowledge of the terrain and their ability to fight, in some degree at least, on ground of their own choosing; the probable NATO ability to use atomic explosives placed, not delivered by plane or artillery, in key routes of advance; the probable effectiveness of persistent gas; and the fact that equality of manpower is not essential to a successful defense, as has been again demonstrated in Korea.

General Fellers says flatly that "it is known that no progress exists to create sufficient NATO air power to control the air over NATO defenses." He makes the familiar charge that "our military establishment is being shaped along the line of the last three wars rather than meet the conditions of the next war." Infantry generals, he says, have long dominated our military planning and still believe that war can be decided finally only by ground combat. The "bayonet fighters" are inclined "to build all the cannon, tanks, ships, aircraft and infantry and armored divisions that our economy and manpower will stand."

Before going on to his outline of "the new defense" in the second part of his book, General Fellers sets forth "seven obvious facts":

- (1) Our supply of long-range bombers is so small that all would be lost in a few weeks of war.
- (2) Our interceptor fighter force is too small to offer even reasonable air defense of American air bases, war industry and population centers
- (3) U.S. anti-aircraft defenses are inadequate.
- (4) The defense against a Red sub-

marine threat to coastal cities and shipping is not solved.

(5) Ground forces have not been allocated for the defense of our existing strategic bases (Alaska, United States, Greenland, Iceland, Labrador, the Azores, and North Africa).

(6) NATO ground forces are wholly inadequate. (At least 100 divisions are needed to meet the initial phase of a Red attack; there are now 25.)

(7) Enough air cover for NATO ground forces is not even on order.

He also points out that we face an enemy which outnumbers us, that rocket and jet propulsion have moved aircraft into supersonic speeds, that atomic and hydrogen bombs now have much more power than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and that Russia could deliver atomic bombs over every NATO capital eighty minutes after its twin jet bombers take off from East Germany, and could explode them in a matter of hours over American air bases and industrial areas. Despite all this, Fellers says, "we still plan to fight for a line."

His solution is "the best air force in the world, supported by an adequate army and navy." He believes that once this policy is given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff we shall have effective cooperation and a true defense. He develops his thesis with logic and clarity, but "the best air force in the world" brought up to the strength that Fellers believes necessary would presumably require cuts in Army and Navy appropriations to a point where it would be doubtful that we would have an "adequate" Army and Navy. Then, too, some of the statements presented as facts in his arguments may well be more accurately described as opinions. The *New York Times* review previously referred to concludes that General Fellers is "not always convincing in his answers" and that "the issue is too complex to be settled so neatly."

The fact is, of course, that retired officers (this reviewer included) and newspaper columnists (Drew Pearson and the Alsops included), free of the awful responsibility that rests on the shoulders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, can appear to solve vital problems with simple solutions which they might be very slow to adopt if theirs was the authority and responsibility.—

MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY.

A JOB THAT NEEDS DOING

THE UNEDUCATED. By Eli Ginzberg and Douglas W. Bray. Columbia University Press. 246 Pages; \$4.50.

Ask any GI, "Could we have used eighty-nine more divisions in World War II?" The answer, of course, is yes. Enough prospective recruits in World War II were found mentally deficient to man eighty-nine divisions—716,000 of them. In the first year of the Korean war, 300,000 were rejected for the same cause. It would be impossible to know how many of these men were truly mentally deficient, and

how many were the victims of a mere lack of education, but there are some figures here that indicate we have a problem.

During World War II the military services, appalled by the number of men who couldn't read warning signs and bulletin-board notices, and forced to take these men by law, instituted special training units to offer them a quick basic course in reading and writing. According to the authors, these courses made fair and even good soldiers out of many an eight-ball, and should be an activity of the armed forces in peace and war. The armed forces have different ideas: living in a country where every activity of the military is looked upon as another grab for the supreme power, dabbling in mass education would be an invitation for the pseudo-liberals to scream that fascism is here. This is someone else's job and they ought to be at it. There are other good reasons, too, why the military doesn't want the assignment. The military believes that its peacetime personnel is a cadre, and should consist of exceptional men rather than marginal discards so the private of today can be the zebra-striped NCO or the Second John of the expanded army. This makes sense, as does the thought that appropriations are hard to come by, and they should be used for military training rather than in doing a job that should be done before the man ever takes the oath.

The authors point out that those who lack education come from the poorer states that just can't afford the outlays that good teachers and proper schools would require, and that even if the money were there, the Negro, the back-country resident, the Navajo on the reservation, and the uneducated man who works a full day on a job and lacks motivation to spend his evenings on book larnin', all would bring special problems. The book holds to the belief that eradication of illiteracy by its very nature is a federal, rather than a state problem, and the best federal agency to move in on a solution is the armed forces, more specifically, the Army.

The book covers more ground than this, however. The military provided the figures for the study on the basis of World Wars I and II and Korean experiences, and the military was chosen by the authors as the agency to lick the problem, but the hard facts have their application in industry and commerce as well. A man who can't fill out an application blank, or read a sign that says "DANGER—22,000 Volts!", or figure out his pay after deductions for income tax, social security, hospitalization and flowers for the foreman's wife, is a nuisance in any industrial operation. Furthermore, he can't be promoted, so his on-the-job training is partly wasted, and it takes longer to train him because he can't study the manuals that come with the machine.

The authors pull no punches in explaining how the Army lost its shirt to the Navy and Air Force during World War

II when it came to dividing up the more intelligent men at the induction stations. Every infantry soldier has his stories of the thickheaded character who almost got everyone killed because he couldn't read, while Ph.Ds swept out Air Corps barracks.

We'll go along with Messrs. Ginzberg and Bray: something had better be done before we tangle with the Red first team, or we're going to be using atomic scientists and nucleonic experts in infantry squads for lack of men, while strong-backed expert marksmen get tight every Saturday night at the county seat. But we agree with the armed services—it's someone else's job. We have troubles of our own.—A.S.


UP THE LADDER TO THE P. I.

THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES. United States Army in World War II. By Robert Ross Smith. Government Printing Office, 1953. 600 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; Index. \$5.00.

This volume is in a sense a testimonial to the dominant personality of General Douglas MacArthur. It was through his almost singlehanded efforts that the Philippines were "approached." The strategic background of the war in the Pacific had reached an impasse early in 1944. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Admiral Nimitz believed that the route through the Central Pacific to the Japanese homeland would be strategically more decisive while MacArthur felt that our tremendous moral obligation to liberate the Philippines was an overriding consideration. The issue was not finally decided, however, until the Hawaii conference in July 1944, attended by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Nimitz and MacArthur, at which time General MacArthur brought the President into sympathy with his views.

The approach to the Philippines took a route through New Guinea, Wakde, Biak, the Vogelkop Peninsula, the Palaus, and Morotai. These operations were the proving ground for the Sixth Army (and later the Eighth) that fought in the Philippines. Few battles have been fought under worse climatic and terrain conditions. And it seems most likely, few battles have been undertaken with poorer intelligence, maps and reconnaissance. Add to these the unusually difficult problems of shipping and logistics generally and it isn't difficult to conclude that good fortune and poor Japanese leadership contributed in a large measure to our success. The indomitable spirit, courage and resourcefulness of the American soldier and the U.S. superiority in weapons, supplies, equipment, air and naval power must be given a large share of the credit.

Since all of these operations involved close collaboration between land, sea and air forces, the planning that went into them was usually complex. The necessity for coordinating with the Central Pacific Theater for air, naval and shipping support was another harassing factor. Quite rightly then, the author opens his book with a rather detailed study of the staff work that went into the Hollandia opera-



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tion. This operation embodied most of the difficulties that cropped up in future planning.

There was not much variety in any of these various operations. All but one of them involved amphibious landings on comparatively lightly manned, enemy-held islands. Jagged coral reefs, mangrove swamps, dense rain forest and steaming jungle were constantly before our forces. There were many protracted and bitterly contested battles before most areas were secured.

Fortunately, only one of these landings was seriously opposed on the beaches by the Japanese, and that confronted the Marines at Peleliu. Had they been so opposed, serious disasters could have occurred and our casualties would have been greater. That these landings weren't strongly contested was due more to good luck than good planning. Almost without exception our intelligence was woefully weak. The enemy's strength, location and capabilities were almost never known and in a half-dozen instances, the beaches chosen for landings proved impassable or no suitable routes for exploitation of the landings could be found.

The landing at Tanahmerah Bay near Hollandia is an example. At Red Beach 2, which was selected as the principal landing area, the terrain was found to be much more difficult than had been anticipated. "Contrary to estimates, which had been based primarily on interpretation of aerial photographs, Red Beach 2 proved to be but thirty yards deep. Behind this narrow beach was discovered a wide swamp covering most of the area which the task force had planned to use for bivouacs and supply dumps. The swamp was soon found impassable for everything except the individual infantrymen bearing only small arms." Then it was discovered that there was no trail connecting Red Beach 2 with Red Beach 1 where the remainder of the force was landing and it proved impossible to build such a road. The landings in the Palaus were the only Central Pacific operations covered in this volume. They rank among the most costly battles of the war. The 1st Marine Division was assigned to take Peleliu and Major General Rupertus, the Division Commander, estimated he could take the island in four days. He was wrong by two and a half months. After about five days, the 81st Division, which had completed its mission of capturing Augaur, was called in to assist the Marines and stayed until the Japanese were defeated. The combined Army and Marine force killed or captured 14,000 Japanese while incurring 9,800 battle casualties themselves.

Robert Ross Smith has done a fine detailed history of this tedious march back to the Philippines. Each of the operations is described in detail and augmented by fine sketches, maps and illustrations. His work is well but unobtrusively documented and while he has sympathetically understood the difficulties under which our troops la-

bored, he has retained a critical objectivity which certainly enhances the usefulness of this work. Since he presents too the strategic and high-level background which spawned these operations, with his frequent summation of Japanese dispositions and strategy, he provides the means which make this volume a self-supporting effort and a top-notch battle history.—R.F.C.

BISMARCK'S GRANDSON AND THE REDS

I JOINED THE RUSSIANS. By Count Heinrich von Einsiedel. Yale University Press, 1953. 306 Pages; Index; Illustrations. \$4.00.

This is the story of a young man who decided to help the enemy of his country for what he devoutly believed to be the good of his country. The young man was the twenty-one-year-old German fighter pilot, Count Heinrich von Einsiedel, shot down before Stalingrad in 1942. He was Bismarck's great-grandson, and undoubtedly because of Bismarck's policy of co-operation between Germany and Russia he became the object of special interest to his Russian captors.

There is no question of Einsiedel's physical courage. He was credited with thirty-five enemy planes shot down when he became a prisoner. If one can accept all the details of his story, there is also ample evidence of a high degree of moral courage in his relations both with the Communists and the Nazis. He recalls how his family and friends at first welcomed Hitler and the Nazis. But after the *Putsch*, he relates, many Germans hated Hitler for his reign of terror and corruption. Einsiedel himself, because he believed that "criminals" like Hitler and his colleagues were heading his country toward the inevitable ruin, decided to help bring about its defeat when he became prisoner.

His book tells the military reader how the Russians recruited, organized, and trained the Free German Committee for psychological warfare and what their methods were. It tells how they treated prisoners of war and persuaded generals like Von Paulus to join them, and discusses the effectiveness of their strategy and tactics.

But the book is chiefly the story of a young man's conversion to Communism and his subsequent disillusionment. It is a devastating indictment of Communism that describes in detail the gulf between the theory and practice of that materialistic religion. But we shall first consider his purely military comments.

Although he believes a hot war can be avoided, Einsiedel is convinced that if one does come the vast spaces of Russia will no longer serve as an obstacle to victory by the West. Today's motor vehicles have made that space far less a hindrance to invasion than it was in the Napoleonic era or even in Hitler's campaigns. Furthermore, he is certain that the West has overestimated the military achievement of the Soviet counteroffensive from Stalingrad to Berlin. He affirms that:

The Soviet army crushed the Wehr-

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macht with its weight but did not defeat it by means of strategy. And owing to the clumsiness of the Soviet strategic leadership, the lethargy of the middle and lower officer corps, and the lack of initiative in all ranks, the cost in blood of this advance was disproportionately high. Even the battles of annihilation which the Red Army won were in no instance, even in the case of Stalingrad, due to its initiative. Rather they were presented to it by Hitler through his disregard for the most elementary laws of strategy. In the areas where the insane corporal did not have his finger in the pie, similar threats were successfully met by even mediocre General Staff officers through tactical and strategic maneuvers of evasion.

Although Einsiedel believes that a Soviet offensive against Western Europe today would undoubtedly be initially successful, he insists that the Russians would be utterly unable to organize militarily and politically to defend and control the occupied territories and make use of their resources for war. He is also of the opinion that the fighting morale of the Soviet Army, which was "none too high even when they were defending their own home soil," would be lowered to a disastrous degree by seeing the far higher standard of living of the countries they were invading. He emphasizes the fact that with no American supplies—they were of paramount importance in the Russian victory against Hitler—the Red Army would be at a great disadvantage. Einsiedel says, too, that during his early years as a prisoner in Russia, "if it had not been for the tinned meat from Chicago, millions would probably have died of hunger."

There are other military aspects of his story, but its main interest lies in its analysis of Communism. Einsiedel's conversion to Communism was the consequence of his indoctrination in the writings of Lenin soon after he was taken prisoner. This convinced him that the Marxist concept of society provided a positive program for avoiding economic crises and mass unemployment, which neither the Church nor Democracy had been able to prevent. He apparently swallowed all the tenets of the Communist faith, yet by the middle of 1944 he was profoundly aware of the contrast between the theory and the practice of Communism. It is hard to understand why he continued to believe in Communism while a prisoner in Russia until 1947, and did not break from it until he had been in East Berlin nearly a year.

At that time he went to the American sector where he was imprisoned and charged with possession of false papers and with espionage. His conviction on these charges and his subsequent months in solitary confinement proved to be his road to Damascus. He had seen and recorded in previous years from personal observation in Russia the corruption and the misery of life in the Soviet Union. As early as 1944, he referred to life in Russia as lived in "this anxious atmosphere poi-

soned by suspicion, hypocrisy, and Byzantine intrigue." During his months of enforced contemplation in an American prison, he began to realize that the materialistic interpretation of man and his history imposed on the Russian people by a brutal Communist party, without any ethical or spiritual basis, was bound to fail. A reign of terror and denial of intellectual and spiritual freedom must inevitably continue to be the policy of the Soviet rulers, and he had had enough of that.

This denunciation of the Soviet regime by a disillusioned convert to Communism is not lessened in effectiveness by Einsiedel's unwillingness to accept Western democracy as the ideal refuge for an ex-Communist. His enthusiasm for the United States is somewhat restrained, to say the least. But since his views are shared by many foreigners they should be kept in mind. He writes:

"But is Americanism a future worth striving for? Haven't pursuit of the dollar, the conveyor belt, skyscrapers, crime thrillers, the jazz mania done more to demoralize the world and turn man into a mass creature than could a collectivist party dictatorship inspired by a socialist ideal? Where is the towering cultural achievement of America which would lend inner justification to the wealth of its ruling classes?"

This widely held stereotype of the United States is convincing evidence of the great need for increased efforts on the part of this country to counteract these impressions which vastly diminish our influence abroad.—BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD ARMSTRONG.

BOOKS RECEIVED

DICTIONARY OF GAMES. By J. B. Pick. The Philosophical Library. 318 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.75. How to play 450 games, indoors and outdoors.

POPULAR MECHANICS MANUAL FOR FORD OWNERS. By C. E. Parker. Popular Mechanics Press. 304 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.50.

ERIC SLOANE'S WEATHER BOOK. Duell, Sloan and Pearce-Little, Brown and Company. 90 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.75.

STUDIO: ASIA. Written and Illustrated by John Groth. The World Publishing Company. 208 Pages; \$4.95. A report on the Korean war by the author of *Studio: Europe*. Complete with his own drawings.

ELIAS BOUDINOT: Patriot and Statesman 1740-1821. By George Adams Boyd. Princeton University Press. 321 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00.

THE BEST HUMOR ANNUAL. Edited by Louis Untermeyer and Ralph E. Shikes. Henry Holt & Company. 334 Pages; \$3.75.

GOOD FOR A LAUGH. By Bennett Cerf. Garden City Books. 220 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.00.

THE BERLIN STORY. By Curt Riess. The Dial Press. 368 Pages; \$3.75.

SMITH'S LONDON JOURNAL. By H. Allen Smith. Doubleday & Company, Inc. 288 Pages; \$3.00. One of our favorite zany reports on his trip to London.

JORDAN'S DICTIONARY OF CIVIL DEFENCE. Edited by Carlton Wallace. Philosophical Library, Inc. 160 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.75. A British effort.

CANADA: THE GOLDEN HINGE. By Leslie Roberts. Rinehart & Company, Inc. 288 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.50. A description of a new Canada important economically.

AMY VANDERBILT'S COMPLETE BOOK OF ETIQUETTE: A Guide to Gracious Living. Doubleday & Co., Inc. 700 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.75. This is a new kind of etiquette book which recognizes the fact that many people do not have servants and that there are thousands of families without a full dress suit.

ONE-UPMANSHIP. By Stephen Potter. Henry Holt and Company. 177 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.75. By the author of *Gamesmanship* and *Lifemanship*.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE WORKS. Edited by Peter Alexander. Random House. 1376 Pages; \$3.75.

EUROPE, second edition. By Samuel Van Valkenburg and Colbert C. Held. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 826 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$7.50. Emphasizes biographical factors.

WHERE TO RETIRE AND HOW: A Comprehensive Guide. By Fessenden S. Blanchard. Dodd, Mead & Company. 299 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00.

REPORT FROM PARADISE. By Mark Twain, with drawings by Charles Locke. Harper & Brothers. 94 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.50.

U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, Pictorial Record, The War Against Japan. Edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield. Office of the Chief of Military History. 471 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.50.

ARMS OF OUR FIGHTING MEN: Bazookas, Big Guns, Tanks.

JETS OF THE WORLD: Fighters, Bombers, Transports.

WINGS OF OUR AIR FORCE: Bombers, Fighters, Transports.

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By Major C. B. Colby, CAP. Coward-McCann, Inc. 62 Pages each; Illustrated; \$1.00 each.

CONTEMPORARY ETHIOPIA. By David A. Talbot. Philosophical Library. 267 Pages; Index; \$4.50.

HOW TO TRAIN SUPERVISORS, 4th revised edition. By R. O. Beckman. Harper & Brothers. 335 Pages; Index; \$4.00.

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